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Abstract
The Supreme Court of Canada’s articulation for the test for discrimination under section 15 of the Charter has
undergone numerous permutations over the past twenty-five years. The Supreme Court introduced its latest
round of changes in its 2013 decision in Québec (Attorney General) v A and its 2015 decision in
Kahkewistahaw First Nation v Taypotat. Together, these two decisions clarified that the appropriate approach
to section 15 was not one focused strictly on stereotype and prejudice, but rather on all contextual factors that
may inform whether an impugned law violates the norm of substantive equality. T T his paper critically
analyzes the impact of Québec v A and Taypotat by examining how courts across the country have articulated
the doctrinal messages of these two decisions, and applied them in practice. Both quantitative and qualitative
analyses are employed. Under the quantitative approach, the likelihood of mounting a successful s. 15
challenge under the new framework set by Québec v Aand Taypotat as compared to the prior test from Kapp
and Withler is considered. Under the qualitative approach, a number of key questions are asked, including:
what the meaning of theQuébec v A and Taypotat touchstone for discrimination – “arbitrary disadvantage” –
is; what role stereotype and prejudice continue to play as indicia of discrimination; and what other contextual
factors courts will examine in assessing whether discrimination has occured. The author concludes that
although the approach under Québec v A and Taypotat requires some fine-tuning, overall it is a positive move
toward a less formalistic, less onerous standard for equality claimants that better reflects section 15’s focus on
substantive equality.
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Supreme Court’s Latest Decisions on 
Section 15 of the Charter
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 The Supreme Court of Canada’s articulation for the test for discrimination under section 15 
of the Charter has undergone numerous permutations over the past twenty-five years. The 
Supreme Court introduced its latest round of changes in its 2013 decision in Québec (Attorney 
General) v A and  its 2015 decision in Kahkewistahaw First Nation v Taypotat. Together, these 
two decisions clarified that the appropriate approach to section 15 was not one focused 
strictly on stereotype and prejudice, but rather on all contextual factors that may inform 
whether an impugned law violates the norm of substantive equality. This paper critically 
analyzes the impact of Québec v A and Taypotat by examining how courts across the country 
have articulated the doctrinal messages of these two decisions, and applied them in practice. 
Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are employed. Under the quantitative approach, the 
likelihood of mounting a successful s. 15 challenge under the new framework set by Québec 
v Aand Taypotat as compared to the prior test from Kapp and Withler is considered. Under the 
qualitative approach, a number of key questions are asked, including: what the meaning of 
theQuébec v A and Taypotat touchstone for discrimination – “arbitrary disadvantage” – is; what 
role stereotype and prejudice continue to play as indicia of discrimination; and what other 
contextual factors courts will examine in assessing whether discrimination has occured. The 
author concludes that although the approach under Québec v A and Taypotat requires some 
fine-tuning, overall it is a positive move toward a less formalistic, less onerous standard for 
equality claimants that better reflects section 15’s focus on substantive equality.
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IN LAW V CANADA (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Justice Iacobucci 
famously described section 15 of the Charter1 as “perhaps [its] … most conceptually 
difficult provision.”2 With the approach to section 15 having undergone five 
different formulations in the past twenty-five years, this statement has proven 
to be true. It is little wonder that the interpretation of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s (“SCC”) analytical framework for section 15 has been described as 
“daunting,”3 and its evolution a “winding course.”4
The 2013 decision of Quebec (Attorney General) v A5 introduced the latest 
round of changes to the analytical approach to section 15. It threw into question 
the previous requirement (established by R v Kapp6 and Withler v Canada 
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
2. [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 2, 170 DLR (4th) 1 [Law].
3. Beverley McLachlin PC, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14:1 
SCLR (2d) 17 at 17.
4. Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v GH, TV and Eastern Woodlands Métis of Nova 
Scotia, 2016 ONSC 6287 at para 48, 262 ACWS (3d) 322 [Catholic Children], citing Peter 
W Hogg, “What is Equality?: The Winding Course of Judicial Interpretation” (2005) 29:1 
SCLR (2d) 39 at 41.
5. 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 SCR 61 [Quebec v A].
6. 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp].
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(Attorney General)7) that discrimination be shown by evidence of stereotype 
or prejudice. Directly following the decision, Quebec v A’s direct impact was 
unclear, not least of all because the Court split 5-4 regarding the section 15 
issue. Quebec v A was followed by Kahkewistahaw First Nation v Taypotat,8 which 
contained a more unequivocal statement that the appropriate approach to section 
15 was not one focused strictly on stereotype and prejudice, but rather on all 
contextual factors that may inform whether an impugned law violates the norm 
of substantive equality.
This article critically analyzes the after-effects of Quebec v A and Taypotat 
by striving to understand how courts have construed the doctrinal messages of 
these two decisions since they were rendered, and how those doctrines have been 
employed in practice. The article proceeds in three Parts.
Part I explores the evolution of the SCC’s jurisprudence on section 15 and 
contemplates the major turning points for each iteration of the Court’s approach. 
The history of the Court’s section 15 decisions is important not only because it 
serves as a refresher for an area of law that has been anything but straightforward 
in its development, but because Quebec v A and Taypotat in fact incorporate 
concepts from prior jurisprudence in their version of the approach to section 15. 
A historical overview is thus helpful for situating the judgments in Quebec v A 
and Taypotat, because these two decisions mark a full-circle return to the flexible, 
contextual inquiry into discrimination championed by the Court in earlier 
section 15 cases, particularly Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia9 and Law.
Part II then examines the Quebec v A and Taypotat cases in detail. The debate 
over the role of stereotype and prejudice that was at the heart of the Court’s split 
in Quebec v A is introduced. I follow with a discussion of Taypotat and reflect on 
the benefits of the contextual, multifactorial approach advocated for in that case.
As enlightening as Quebec v A and Taypotat have been for some aspects of 
the section 15 inquiry, they have simultaneously clouded other aspects. Courts 
have indeed lamented that “controversy remains about precisely how [the] 
discrimination evaluation is to be undertaken.”10 Thus, I conclude Part II by 
raising four key questions that have cropped up in the wake of the modifications 
introduced by these two cases, namely:
7. 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 396 [Withler].
8. 2015 SCC 30, [2015] 2 SCR 548 [Taypotat].
9. [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews cited to SCR].
10. R v Madeley, 2016 ONCJ 108 at para 132, 30 CR (7th) 171 [Madeley].
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(1) Is the approach introduced by Quebec v A and Taypotat different than 
what has come before? If so, which doctrinal changes introduced by 
these cases will be applied in practice?
(2) What residual role does evidence of stereotype and prejudice 
(thought to be required post-Kapp and Withler) play in 
showing disadvantage?
(3) What are the effects of Quebec v A and Taypotat’s repeated 
use of the phrase “arbitrary disadvantage” as a touchstone for 
determining whether an impugned law is discriminatory within the 
meaning of section 15?
(4) What factors other than stereotype and prejudice may be used to 
inform the “flexible, contextual” inquiry promoted by Quebec v 
A and Taypotat?
Part III attempts to provide answers to the above questions by reviewing 
section 15 cases that have considered either Quebec v A or Taypotat. The survey is 
pan-Canadian, examining how courts across the country have both interpreted 
and applied the principles articulated in Taypotat and Quebec v A. The goal is 
to determine whether these two decisions have coloured the section 15 analyses 
conducted by lower courts, and if so, how. My observations are intermingled with 
recommendations for future doctrinal developments and points of clarification 
in light of the issues that emerge from my analysis of the case law.
I. GROWING PAINS: THE EVOLUTION OF THE APPROACH 
TO SECTION 15
The first stage of a section 15(1) analysis has always been to determine whether 
a law creates a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground. While 
demonstrating differential treatment is necessary for a successful section 15 
claim, it is not sufficient. Not all distinctions created by a law are considered 
discriminatory under section 15. Laws classify individuals based on group 
membership all the time, because “the application of different rules, regulations, 
requirements and qualifications to different persons is necessary for the governance 
of modern society.”11 Common examples are age-based laws that restrict underage 
people from drinking, driving, or smoking, and laws that impose different tax 
burdens on individuals depending on their income. It would upend effective 
governance to allow individuals to challenge these types of laws. Rather, the goal 
11. Andrews, supra note 9 at 168-69.
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of section 15 has always been to identify those laws that make a group-based 
distinction that—given a specific law’s content, its purpose, and its impact on 
those it does and does not apply to—strikes at the root of a right meant to ensure 
“equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination.”12
Once a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground is 
demonstrated, the next step of the inquiry is to determine whether that distinction 
is discriminatory, or, using post-Taypotat language, whether it is arbitrary. While 
the aim of sorting discriminatory distinctions from neutral ones is simple, the 
path towards it has been anything but. The test for whether an impugned law is 
discriminatory has evolved numerous times over the years, and has been one of 
the most contentious aspects of section 15 jurisprudence.
The Court first introduced its section 15 approach in the 1989 Andrews 
decision.13 The test then underwent significant revisions in each of the following 
sets of cases: the 1995 Equality Trilogy of Miron v Trudel,14 Egan v Canada,15 and 
Thibaudeau v Canada;16 the 1999 case of Law; the 2008 revisions introduced by 
Kapp and reinforced by Withler; ending with the most recent iteration in Quebec 
v A and Taypotat.
Each time the Court has revised the section 15 test, it has maintained that 
the purpose of the provision has remained the same: to capture instances where 
substantive, not just formal, equality is violated. What has been difficult to pin 
down for the Court is how to structure a test that achieves that singular goal. 
It is hardly surprising that settling on an approach to equality continues to 
beleaguer the SCC, given the Court’s own admissions regarding the conceptual 
pitfalls surrounding section 15.17 The Court’s failure to provide a positive 
definition of what, exactly, substantive equality is18 mirrors the lack of a concrete 
definition of equality in the Charter itself.19 The amorphous, undefined nature 
of the concept of substantive equality contributes to the difficulty of attempting 
to formulate a universal, one-size-fits-all definition of equality, and a universal, 
one-size-fits-all approach to section 15. The goal of section 15 is not absolute 
12. Charter, supra note 1, s 15(1).
13. As the Court acknowledged in Law. Law, supra note 2 at para 2, citing Andrews, supra note 9.
14. [1995] 2 SCR 418, 23 OR (3d) 160 [Miron].
15. [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609.
16. [1995] 2 SCR 627, 124 DLR (4th) 449.
17. See e.g. Andrews, supra note 9 at 164; Law, supra note 2 at para 2.
18. Anthony Robert Sangiuliano, “Substantive Equality As Equal Recognition: A New Theory of 
Section 15 of the Charter” (2015) 52:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 601 at 608.
19. David W Elliott, “Comment on Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia and Section 
15(1) of the Charter: The Emperor’s New Clothes” (1989) 35:1 McGill LJ 235 at 249.
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equality at all times and at all costs, but rather “justified equality.”20 Assessing 
whether a distinction is discriminatory or arbitrary helps a court determine 
“which kinds of equality are justified and which are not,”21 an inquiry that 
naturally turns on the facts of each specific case.
In pursuing its goal of protecting substantive equality, the Court has recast 
its approach to section 15 four times since Andrews. While its revisions have 
occurred in search of a laudable goal, they have introduced a great deal of 
uncertainty to those bringing section 15 claims and those adjudicating them.
The following Part I analysis features a brief tour through the development 
of the Court’s analytical approach to determining whether a law is discriminatory 
or arbitrary. I begin with Andrews, where the Court pioneered the ideal of 
substantive equality towards which all subsequent SCC decisions dealing with 
section 15 have strived. I then discuss the 1995 Equality Trilogy, which housed a 
controversy concerning the appropriate role of an impugned law’s purpose to the 
section 15 inquiry that split the Court three ways. I then discuss Law, which not 
only settled the debate of the Equality Trilogy, but also introduced a four-step, 
formalized framework for assessing equality claims, of which human dignity was 
the cornerstone. Part I concludes with a discussion of Kapp and Withler, two 
decisions that together brought an end to Law’s focus on human dignity, and 
instead refocused the section 15 inquiry on prejudice and stereotypes.
In turn, Part II opens with a discussion of Quebec v A and Taypotat, reflecting 
on what the section 15 approach following these two cases looks like, particularly 
with regards to which components are new, and which components have been 
repurposed from prior iterations of the test.
A. THE FOUNDATION OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY: ANDREWS
The Court’s first case dealing with section 15 was Andrews. In Andrews, Justice 
McIntyre made it clear that the text of section 15 is rooted in four basic rights: 
equality before the law, equality under the law, the right to the equal protection 
of the law, and the right to equal benefit of the law.22 This expansive wording was 
seen by many as a protection of more than mere formal equality. Accordingly, 
Justice McIntyre held that an analytical approach to section 15 that only captured 
unequal treatment of those who were similarly situated was “seriously deficient.”23 
In his words, “a bad law will not be saved merely because it operates equally 
20. Ibid at 249-50.
21. Ibid at 250.
22. Andrews, supra note 9 at 170.
23. Ibid at 166.
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upon those to whom it has application.”24 A law that treats all individuals in an 
identical manner, irrelevant of the differences in their characteristics and context, 
may very well still be a discriminatory law, creating outcomes incongruent with 
a more substantive concept of equality. Justice McIntyre pointed to a number 
of examples to illustrate his point, including the much-maligned pre-Charter 
decision of the SCC in Bliss v Attorney General of Canada,25 where the Court 
ruled that it was not discriminatory to deny a pregnant woman unemployment 
benefits to which she would have been entitled had she not been pregnant. Its 
reasoning? The law treated all pregnant women equally.
Justice McIntyre instead embraced a contextual definition of discrimination 
that considers the law’s effects on a specific claimant or group.26 To attain the 
ideal of full equality before and under the law expressed in the Charter, Justice 
McIntyre clarified that one must look to the impact of a law on the individual 
or group.27 While a discriminatory distinction created by a law must have some 
sort of negative effect (the imposition of a burden or the denial of a benefit), 
it is irrelevant whether the distinction is intentional or not. All that matters is 
that the imposition of the negative effect relates to personal characteristics of the 
individual or group. But imposing a negative effect on the basis of a personal 
characteristic is not enough. It is not discriminatory to draw a distinction based 
on the actual characteristics of an individual. The key consideration is whether 
a law bases a distinction on characteristics that are attributed to the individual 
because of his or her membership in a group. Justice McIntyre thus concluded 
that laws that draw harmful distinctions based on personal characteristics rather 
than an individual’s merits and capacities will “rarely escape the charge of 
discrimination.”28
Some have since argued that the Court’s understanding of substantive equality 
in Andrews was too narrow because it advocated for equality as a “comparative 
concept.”29 Andrews prohibited laws from applying to individuals on the basis 
of irrelevant personal characteristics.30 Critics indicated that this pointed to a 
24. Ibid at 167.
25. [1979] 1 SCR 183, 92 DLR (3d) 417.
26. Martha A McCarthy & Joanna L Radbord, “Foundations for 15(1): Equality in Canada” 
(1999) 6:1 Mich J Gender & L 261 at 289.
27. Andrews, supra note 9 at 165.
28. Ibid at 174-75.
29. See e.g. Denise G Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity” (2003) 63:3 La L Rev 645.
30. Andrews, supra note 9 at 165.
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retention of the language associated to formal equality, as well as the sort of 
comparative exercise that typically underpins formal equality models.31
However, to me, Andrews is more ambitious. Although the decision 
allows for an equality analysis to proceed on a comparative basis, that is not 
an inherently negative feature. Sometimes, a comparative exercise may be the 
simplest way to demonstrate inequality. More importantly, Andrews is a strong 
clarion call for judges and claimants to situate substantive equality at the heart 
of section 15(1). Even though Justice McIntyre did not explicitly identify the 
concept of “substantive equality” in his judgment, the spirit of the concept 
permeates the Andrews decision. Echoes of substantive equality are evident first 
in Justice McIntyre’s outright rejection of the similarly situated test, which can 
produce unacceptable outcomes while espousing a formal concept of equality. 32 
They are also evident in his recognition that laws may not only be discriminatory 
on their face but in their effects, and it is those adverse effects on a group in 
the real world that must be examined to detect discrimination.33 But they are 
most evident in his emphasis on the need for a flexible, contextual approach 
to section 15, one that examines the circumstances and the characteristics of 
an individual relative to others in society.34 A contextual test allows for a more 
systematic consideration of the disadvantages that the individual or group have 
faced in the past and continue to face, and whether the impugned law serves only 
to further that disadvantage.
It is therefore from Andrews that the Court’s present day understanding of 
substantive equality sprouts. As the Court acknowledged in Kapp: “Andrews set 
the template for this Court’s commitment to substantive equality—a template 
which subsequent decisions have enriched but never abandoned.”35
B. DEEP FRACTURES IN THE COURT: THE 1995 EQUALITY TRILOGY
As hopeful as Andrews was in its reach for something more than mere formal 
equality, commentators raised issues with Justice McIntyre’s articulation of the 
approach to section 15 following the judgment, which they argued left room for 
31. See e.g. McCarthy & Radbord, supra note 29 at 300; Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, 
Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Forward Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: 
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989) at 205-12; Beverley Baines, 
“Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 11:3 Const Forum Const 65 at 69.
32. Ibid at 165-68.
33. Ibid at 174.
34. Ibid at 174-75.
35. Kapp, supra note 6 at para 14.
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uncertainty about what exactly constitutes discriminatory treatment.36 The main 
critique was that all adverse distinctions based on a prohibited ground would 
qualify as discriminatory, due to Justice McIntyre’s link between discrimination 
and laws that draw distinctions based on characteristics attributed to an individual 
because of his or her membership in a group. Although Justice McIntyre made clear 
that such laws would usually be discriminatory, rather than always discriminatory, 
37 there remained a concern that the Andrews approach would trivialize section 15 
by deeming all distinctions made by a law to be discriminatory.38
The Court took these criticisms to heart and set about moulding the Andrews 
approach to ensure an additional limitation was added to filter out those laws 
that imposed an adverse distinction based on a prohibited ground, but that were 
still considered non-discriminatory. Thus, the Andrews approach underwent 
its first reformulation in the ensuing 1995 Equality Trilogy of Miron, Egan, 
and Thibaudeau.
Unfortunately, the Equality Trilogy did not immediately provide clear 
answers as to what the post-Andrews approach should be, because of the doctrinal 
rifts within the Court that arose in these three cases. Four judges—Chief Justice 
Lamer, and Justices La Forest, Gonthier, and Major—took a narrower view of 
the section 15 test and added a limitation based on the impugned law’s purpose. 
They held that adverse differential treatment is discriminatory only if the 
alleged enumerated or analogous ground is irrelevant to the goals and values 
of the impugned law. This approach is essentially a rational connection test, 
à la section 1: Is the distinction created by the legislation rationally connected 
to its purpose? Or, in the context of equality, is the distinction (based on what 
Andrews considered irrelevant group characteristics) created by the impugned 
law one that nonetheless promotes its objectives? If so, the impugned law is not 
discriminatory.
36. See Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol 2, 5th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 
2017) at 5526; Luc B Tremblay, “Promoting Equality and Combating Discrimination 
Through Affirmative Action: The Same Challenge? Questioning the Canadian Substantive 
Equality Paradigm” (2012) 60:1 Am J Comp L 181 at 185; Christopher D Bredt & Adam M 
Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for Section 15” (2003) 20:1 
SCLR (2d) 33 at 56; Réaume, supra note 32 at 652-53.
37. See Andrews, supra note 9 at 174-175. In Andrews Justice McIntryre stated: “Distinctions 
based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association 
with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an 
individual’s merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.”
38. See e.g. Miron, supra note 16 at para 131.
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Of course, the problem with this approach is that it gives far too much 
deference to Parliament and the legislatures, allowing governments to circumvent 
section 15 infringement so long as they can ground the distinction created by 
law in the respective law’s purpose. Further, the approach fails to capture what 
has become the true target of substantive equality in modern-day jurisprudence: 
not a law’s discriminatory purposes, but its discriminatory effects. Intention to 
discriminate was not a required feature of section 15 in Andrews, which instead 
emphasized the impact of a law on individuals and groups, in the context of 
combatting systemic discrimination.39 The approach taken by Chief Justice 
Lamer, and Justices La Forest, Gonthier, and Major in the Equality Trilogy 
therefore represented a departure from Andrews’ broader conception of the 
protection afforded by section 15.
Four other judges—Justices Sopinka,  Cory, McLachlin, and Iacobucci—
adopted a more holistic understanding of discrimination—still narrower than 
that advocated for in Andrews, but much broader than that of Chief Justice 
Lamer et al. These judges similarly tied discriminatory treatment to purpose, but 
for them it was the purpose of section 15 itself that was pivotal, not the purpose 
of the impugned legislation. As Justice McLachlin (as she then was) explained in 
Miron, the purpose of section 15 is “to prevent the violation of human dignity 
and freedom through the imposition of limitations, disadvantages or burdens 
through the stereotypical application of presumed group characteristics, rather 
than on the basis of merit, capacity or circumstance.”40
This approach echoes the original approach advocated by Andrews in both 
spirit and substance. The Court continued to move beyond a simple construct 
of formal equality, and towards the more contemporary view that substantive 
equality is an essential element of discrimination; a move that is very much 
reflective of the spirit of Andrews.41 Substantively, the violation of dignity remained 
linked to the imposition of burden through distinctions based on group-linked 
characteristics, rather than actual capacities. At the same time, the approach was 
somewhat of a departure from Andrews in the sense that it moved beyond looking 
at externally-presenting, concrete, and objectively ascertainable indicators of 
discrimination—the actual circumstances and abilities of the individual—to 
include the vaguer, internalized, and therefore more arguably subjective concept 
39. Marc Gold, “Comment: Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia” (1989) 34:4 McGill LJ 
1063 at 1070-71.
40. Miron, supra note 16 at para 140.
41. Withler, supra note 7 at para 42.
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of dignity.42 Additional spins added to the Andrews approach were the inclusion 
of “historical disadvantage” and “stereotypes” as relevant factors to assessing 
whether a violation of dignity had occurred.43
Justice L’Heureux- Dubé did not align herself with either camp, intensifying 
the deep divisions that ran through the Court and the state of general confusion 
around section 15. Instead, she proposed her own approach to section 15, one 
that focused on the impact of the impugned legislation on the affected group, 
and the nature of the interest that was targeted by the distinction created.44 The 
more severe the impact, and the more significant the interest at stake, the more 
likely a law was to be discriminatory.
C. RECONCILIATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY: LAW V 
CANADA
Individual members of the Court did not reconcile their differences with respect 
to the test for section 15(1) until their decision in Law. In Law, the SCC settled 
on a conception of section 15 that confirmed the view from the Equality Trilogy 
that a law will be discriminatory if the burden it imposes or the benefit it denies 
harms an individual’s dignity.
Specifically, the contours of human dignity were filled in by the Court’s 
explanation that dignity relates to feelings of “self-respect” and “self-worth” 
that are enhanced by laws that “are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and 
merits of different individuals, taking into account the context underlying their 
differences.”45 In turn, human dignity is harmed whenever a law treats people 
unfairly based upon “personal traits or circumstances which do not relate 
to individual needs, capacities, or merits,” or when people are “marginalized, 
ignored, or devalued.”46
In addition to picking up and running with the idea of human dignity as a 
foundation of substantive equality from Miron, the Court in Law also identified 
a structured approach consisting of a list of four factors that claimants could 
42. Sheilah Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80:1 
Can Bar Rev 299 at 315-16; Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” 
(2001) 27:1 Queen’s LJ 299; Debra M McAllister, “Section 15: The Unpredictability of the 
Law Test” (2003) 15:1 NJCL 3; Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 
of the Charter” (2003) 48:4 McGill LJ 627; Bredt & Dodek, supra note 39; Réaume, supra 
note 32 at 646, 677.
43. Miron, supra note 16 at paras 128, 133, 148-49, 156.
44. See ibid at paras 80-110.
45. Law, supra note 2 at para 53.
46. Ibid.
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point to as support for their claim that their dignity was harmed. The approach 
was contextual and responsive to the specific situation of the claimant by 
allowing the factors to be applied flexibly and non-exhaustively. Simultaneously, 
by enumerating specific categories linked to the dignity inquiry, the Court 
made the test for section 15 violations clearer and more concrete—which is 
especially important when dealing with a nebulous and individualistic concept 
like human dignity.
The four factors Law assimilated into the section 15 inquiry are as follows:
(1) “Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability 
experienced by the individual or group at issue.”47 This factor links 
stereotyping, prejudice, and pre-existing disadvantage together as 
indicators of the claimant’s association with a historically more 
advantaged or disadvantaged group or groups (although subsequent 
jurisprudence would decouple these as separate indicators of a 
section 15 breach). The Court also noted that these factors were not 
determinative, but indicated they carried significant weight because 
the goal of section 15 is to protect vulnerable members of “discrete 
and insular minorities.”
(2) “The correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground or 
grounds on which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity, 
or circumstances of the claimant or others.”48 This factor incorporated 
the focus of Andrews and the Equality Trilogy on burdens that 
legislation imposes that are not grounded in the claimant’s real-life 
characteristics and circumstances, but rather through an erroneous 
conception of their characteristics and circumstances based on their 
membership in a discrete group.
(3) “The ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon 
a more disadvantaged person or group in society.”49 This factor 
specifically speaks to claims brought by a more advantaged member 
of society. The Court recognized that “leg-up” legislation that 
creates benefits for disadvantaged groups over advantaged groups is 
not discriminatory as it serves the purposes of section 15 and will 
not violate the dignity of advantaged individuals.
47. Ibid at para 88.
48. Ibid at paras 69-71.
49. Ibid at paras 72-73.
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(4) “The nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned 
law.”50 This factor incorporated Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s approach 
to section 15 from the Equality Trilogy. The Court recognized 
that consequences that are particularly severe or specific to the 
enumerated or analogous group are more likely to be considered 
discriminatory.
Despite the more categorical approach to the issue of discrimination instituted 
by Law and its emphasis on human dignity, Justice Iacobucci maintained that 
Law showed “great continuity” with Andrews,51 because substantive equality, 
in the form of guarding against systematic discrimination, remained the driving 
force behind the Law approach. While the four Law factors intended to get at 
violations of human dignity, the overall purpose of section 15 remained the 
same: stopping “the evil of oppression” and remedying “the imposition of unfair 
limitations upon opportunities, particularly for those persons or groups who 
have been subject to historical disadvantage, prejudice, and stereotyping.”52
The approach espoused in Law was an interesting blend of abstraction and 
formalism. The Court coupled the already ambiguous concept of substantive 
equality to the even more ambiguous concept of dignity, and then attempted to 
pin both down through the application of its four concrete factors. Despite the 
Court’s attempt to resolve the issues around the conceptual looseness of “human 
dignity” with the structure of its four-part test, in the end, Law was criticized for 
being both too abstract and too formal. It was considered too abstract because 
human dignity was far too malleable and elusive to form the basis of equality.53 
Its use, many argued, redirected the equality inquiry from historic and systemic 
disadvantage to a matter of personal experience and sentiment. The individualized 
nature of dignity meant the concept could not be applied reliably in a legal test, 
leading to unpredictable and widely varied outcomes, while also presenting an 
onerous evidentiary burden for claimants.54 Law was simultaneously criticized 
for its formalism, which was said to be directly contrary to the intention of 
Andrews. Although the Court in Law cautioned that its four-step approach 
was not intended as a “rigid test,” it was nonetheless “eagerly seized on by law 
50. Ibid at paras 74-75.
51. Ibid at para 42.
52. Ibid.
53. Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “The Continual Reinvention of Section 15 of 
the Charter” (2013) 64:1 UNBLJ 19 at 32 [Koshan & Hamilton, “Reinvention”].
54. Hogg, supra note 39 at 55-28, 55-29; McAllister, supra note 45. See also Nicholas Smith, “A 
Critique of Recent Approaches to Discrimination Law” [2007]:3 NZ L Rev 499 at 516.
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students, lawyers and lower courts as a formula to be marched through” to the 
point that when a new approach was introduced by Kapp, lower courts were 
averse to discarding the Law approach.55
D. A FOCUS OF STEREOTYPE AND PREJUDICE: KAPP AND WITHLER
The analytical framework of Law lasted only nine years until the advent of Kapp 
in 2008. While Kapp maintained the markers of prejudice and stereotypes as 
focal points for section 15 analysis, it sidelined what was perceived to be Law’s 
most problematic element, human dignity, because the Court admitted that 
dignity acted as a barrier to equality rights claimants.56
Formalism was also ostensibly excised from the approach, and the four steps 
of Law reverted to an inquiry based on but a single question: Does the impugned 
law perpetuate stereotype or prejudice?57 Although the factors in Law were no 
longer to be applied “as if they were legislative dispositions,” the Court did leave 
the door open for them to be applied as a tool to help achieve the goal of section 
15: “combating discrimination, defined in terms of perpetuating disadvantage 
and stereotyping.”58
The Kapp test underwent clarification in Withler, but remained unchanged 
in substance.59 Withler merely reinforced the Kapp test as the correct analytical 
approach to equality claims, and filled out the content of the test further. 
In Withler, the SCC explained that the perpetuation of disadvantage or 
prejudice often occurs because a law treats a historically disadvantaged group 
in a manner that exacerbates their situation, thereby recognizing that a group’s 
past experiences with systemic barriers is important.60 The Court also defined 
discrimination based on a stereotype as something that arises when a distinction 
is created by a law that does not correspond to the actual circumstances and 
characteristics of the claimant—the correspondence factor of Law.61 The Court 
noted that such stereotyping typically results in perpetuation of pre-existing 
prejudice and disadvantage, but a group might still be subject to a law that 
creates a discriminatory impact on group members even in the absence of 
historic disadvantage.62
55. Koshan & Hamilton, “Reinvention,” supra note 56 at 31.
56. Kapp, supra note 6 at paras 19-22.
57. Ibid at paras 17, 25.
58. Ibid at para 24.
59. Withler, supra note 7 at para 30.
60. Ibid at para 35.
61. Ibid at para 36.
62. Ibid.
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While Kapp and Withler claimed to be another return to Andrews, 
they failed to achieve the broad, open-ended concept of equality that lay at 
the heart of Andrews. Kapp, like Law, attempted to shoehorn equality into 
a narrower-than-necessary box. However, where Law’s “box” was human 
dignity, Kapp’s consisted of stereotyping and prejudice. This created a large 
gap between the Kapp approach and its goal of substantive equality. Although 
substantive inequality may certainly arise from a demonstration of stereotyping 
and prejudice, there are many other forms of substantive inequality that are 
not captured under the Kapp/Withler approach. As Sophia Moreau highlights, 
a narrow interpretation of discrimination where a claimant must prove either 
prejudice or stereotype has “the unfortunate effect of blinding us to other ways 
in which individuals and groups, that have suffered serious and long-standing 
disadvantage, can be discriminated against.”63 This includes cases without overt 
prejudice and stereotyping that involve “oppression or unfair dominance of one 
group by another, or involve a denial to one group of goods that seem basic or 
necessary for full participation in Canadian society.”64
The emphasis placed by Kapp and Withler on prejudice and stereotyping 
is also concerning because of the danger these two factors had in overtaking 
the remainder of the section 15 analysis. While it was clear that historical 
disadvantage would not be required if prejudice or stereotype were shown—a 
positive development for recognizing novel forms of discriminatory treatment—it 
was no longer clear if historical or systemic disadvantage alone would be enough. 
Kapp and Withler failed to treat historical disadvantage as a separate concept, 
collapsing it into the concepts of prejudice and stereotyping, so that it seemed 
impossible to demonstrate historical disadvantage without first demonstrating 
prejudice and stereotyping.65
Another downside of Kapp and Withler is their treatment of discriminatory 
perceptions versus discriminatory effects. Prejudice and stereotyping are 
concerned with perceptions and attitudes. They try to capture society’s sentiments 
and views towards a group and its members. Under Kapp and Withler, a law 
would breach section 15 when it was based on stereotypes (i.e. perceptions 
that are not linked to the actual circumstances and abilities of the group) or 
63. Sophia Moreau, “R. v. Kapp: New Directions for Section 15” (2008) 40:2 Ottawa L 
Rev 283 at 292.
64. Ibid.
65. See Koshan & Hamilton, “Reinvention,” supra note 56 at 39; Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette 
Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality after Withler” (2011) 
16:1 Rev Const Stud 31 at 50-51 [Koshan & Hamilton, “Mantra”]; Moreau, supra 
note 66 at 291-92.
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prejudice (i.e. preconceived notions regarding the group that are not based on 
reason or actual experience). However, since the time of Andrews, section 15 has 
been concerned with effects-based discrimination (be it intentional or not). The 
focus on stereotyping and prejudice failed to capture that important dimension, 
because it was more concerned with measuring outward attitudes—which may 
often times be intentional66—rather than the actual negative effects a law may 
impose on the group.
Finally, in lieu of restoring the contextual inquiry pioneered by Andrews, 
Kapp and Withler ushered in further formalism in the wake of Law. Admittedly, 
the Court in Withler stated that regardless of whether one is examining prejudice 
or stereotypes as a marker for unequal treatment, the inquiry must be contextual, 
taking into account the actual circumstances of the group and its members, and 
how the law can potentially worsen those circumstances.67 However, providing 
a narrow formula that requires either stereotyping or prejudice means that 
a contextual inquiry can only go so far within the boundaries of those two 
concepts. The truth of the matter was that, following Kapp and Withler, courts 
indeed began applying stereotype and prejudice as rigid, narrow requirements, 
rather than guidelines for a flexible and contextual analysis.68 If the goal of Kapp 
had been to undo the perceived formalism of Law,69 the case had the opposite 
effect in practice, restricting the inquiry into discrimination even further.
Thus, for all of the Court’s claims that Kapp and Withler represented a return 
to the reasoning of Andrews, Kapp and Withler fell far short of delivering Andrews’ 
promise of substantive equality, and were in fact said to “amplify” the move away 
from that promise.70 For some, the Kapp/Withler approach even exemplified the 
“worst” version of the section 15 analytical framework up until that point.71 
Eventually, the concerns regarding Kapp and Withler’s inappropriate focus on 
prejudice and stereotyping came to bear in Quebec v A, where a disagreement on 
the role of these two factors split the Court 5-4.
66. Koshan & Hamilton, “Mantra,” supra note 68 at 51.
67. Withler, supra note 7 at para 37.
68. Koshan & Hamilton, “Reinvention,” supra note 56 at 42, 45.
69. See Moreau, supra note 66 at 293.
70. Margot Young, “Unequal to the Task: ‘Kapp’ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15” 
(2010) 50:1 SCLR (2d) 183 at 203-04.
71. See e.g. Koshan & Hamilton, “Reinvention,” supra note 56 at 21.
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II. A FOCUS ON SYSTEMIC DISADVANTAGE: SECTION 15 
FOLLOWING QUEBEC V A AND TAYPOTAT
A. THE DEBATE OVER THE ROLE OF STEREOTYPE AND PREJUDICE: 
QUEBEC V A
The most recent iteration of the analytical approach to discrimination stems from 
the SCC’s 2013 decision in Quebec v A. The case dealt with the exclusion of 
de facto spouses from provisions under the Civil Code of Québec72 addressing 
spousal support and property division post-separation. A de facto spouse who 
had separated from her partner brought the suit, then subsequently challenged 
the Civil Code provisions that applied to married and civil-union spouses but not 
to de facto spouses. The challenge was brought on the basis of discrimination on 
the ground of marital status.
Quebec v A is a complex case that engages a multitude of issues. The significance 
of the Court’s judgment shifts depending on the lens from which it is viewed. 
Quebec v A may be used as a starting point to discuss, for example: the property 
and support protections that are legislated for married and civil-status partners; 
the role of consent and choice in relationships, and how far the law should go 
to provide additional protections when choice may be illusory; the impact of 
a Charter right claimant’s gender or wealth on her claim; or the divergence of 
Quebec’s unique legal regimes, and the tension between the concept of federalism 
that respects Quebec’s independence and the scope of Charter protections.73
The central conflict debate that arose—for the purposes of this article 
at least—was whether stereotypes and prejudice overtly directed, or merely 
sometimes informed, the section 15 inquiry.  Should the existence of these two 
features be the singular question to ask when analyzing an equality claim, or are 
they merely two of many factors that can inform the analysis?
The issue led to the sort of division regarding the Court’s section 15 approach 
not seen since the Equality Trilogy, with the dissent led by Justice LeBel, and a 
slight majority by Justice Abella.
For Justice LeBel and three other justices, the distinction drawn by the 
impugned legislation did not violate substantive equality because the distinction 
did not fit the binary definition of discrimination as it was based neither on 
prejudice nor stereotyping. Justice LeBel described stereotyping and prejudice 
72. CQLR c CCQ-1991 [Civil Code].
73. See e.g. Sonia Lawrence, “Eric & Lola Roundtable” (6 June 2013), IFLS: The Institute 
for Feminist Legal Studies at Osgoode (blog), online: <ifls.osgoode.yorku.ca/category/
thinkingabout/roundtable/eric-lola>.
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as crucial factors for determining when a law is discriminatory.74 Therefore, the 
case had to be decided by examining whether stereotypes or prejudice against 
common law couples still existed in modern Quebec society. On the issue of 
prejudice (defined as relating to “pejorative attitudes based on strongly held 
views”75), Justice LeBel concluded that although common law couples were 
viewed negatively in the past, this history was insufficient to show a breach of 
section 15: a claimant had to show that a prejudicial attitude persisted. Common 
law spouses were no longer subject to “public opprobrium,” “social ostracism,” 
or “legislative … stigmatization,” so there was no prejudice-based discrimination.76 
Similarly, the Civil Code did not stereotype—that is, its distinctions were not 
based on inaccurate presumptions regarding “personal traits or circumstances 
that do not relate to individual needs, capacities or merits.”77 Rather, Justice 
LeBel characterized the Civil Code as allowing people to freely choose to benefit 
from the post-separation provisions by either marrying or entering into a civil 
union. Those who chose to remain de facto spouses could be seen as opting out 
of the regime.78 The Civil Code’s recognition of the autonomy of a couple was 
therefore related to the individual needs of all couples, not stereotypical views of 
de facto couples.
Justice Abella’s analysis also focused on stereotypes. However, rather than 
probing whether the claimant in the specific case had made out the presence 
of either factor, her judgment advocated the view that evidence of stereotyping 
or prejudice is not even necessary in the first place. Justice Abella argued 
that stereotypes and prejudice place the emphasis of the section 15 inquiry 
inappropriately on discriminatory attitudes and perceptions, when it really is 
discriminatory effects that the section attempts to capture. She voiced the concern 
that requiring claimants “to prove that a distinction perpetuates negative attitudes 
about them imposes a largely irrelevant … burden.”79 Echoing then-Justice 
McLachlin’s decision in Miron, Justice Abella stressed that while attitudes may 
change, historical disadvantage often persists: There has rarely been “a bright 
line demarcating the successful evolution of an historically disadvantaged 
group into a barrier-free reality.”80 Even if society has significantly diminished 
74. Quebec v A, supra note 5 at para 168.
75.  Ibid at para 326.
76. Ibid at paras 248, 249.
77. Ibid at para 201.
78. Ibid at paras 269-75.
79. Ibid at para 330.
80. Ibid at para 318.
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its discriminatory attitudes towards a group, that group may continue to face 
unconscious discrimination.
Justice Abella’s judgment asked us to move away from using the existence 
of stereotypes and prejudice as a narrow gateway—one that for many claimants 
is an “ineffable burden”81— and to instead throw open the doors to section 15. 
She redirected the focus of the inquiry into a more generalized, contextual one, 
capable of rooting out the broad range of ways in which a law’s discriminatory 
impact may manifest. Kapp and Withler, she argued, were never intended to 
restrict the inquiry to stereotypes and prejudice. Rather, these decisions “guide 
us … to a flexible and contextual inquiry into whether a distinction has the 
effect of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage on the claimant because of his 
or her membership in an enumerated or analogous group.”82 Stereotypes and 
prejudice were never meant to be mandatory elements that a claimant must 
show in mounting a successful section 15 claim, They are simply two markers 
of discrimination, but they should not be used to limit other factors that may 
be useful in assessing a section 15 claim. “At the end of the day,” she contended, 
“there is only one question: Does the challenged law violate the norm of substantive 
equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter?”83 Justice Abella’s approach therefore favoured 
the dissociation of disadvantage from a strict demonstration that a negative 
stereotype or prejudice is the origin of said disadvantage. Other types of proof of 
disadvantage can be sufficient to show that discrimination has occurred, so long 
as those proofs go towards demonstrating a violation of substantive equality in 
one form or another.84
Quebec v A itself is an apt example of the value of the contextual inquiry into 
discrimination advocated by Justice Abella. The facts of Quebec v A therefore bear 
brief mention at this point, as they exemplify how a broad, contextual inquiry can 
capture substantive inequality in a way that the binary formula of stereotyping 
and prejudice cannot.
81. Ibid at para 330.
82. Ibid at para 331.
83. Ibid at para 325 [emphasis in original].
84.  Université de Sherbrooke c Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, 2015 
QCCA 1397 at para 54, 260 ACWS (3d) 594 [Sherbrooke], citing Christian Brunelle, “Les 
droits et libertés dans le contexte réel” in École du Barreau du Québec, Collection de droit, vol 
7 (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2014) 25 at 75-76.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL684
The claimant in Quebec v A was a woman, dubbed by the press as “Lola.” 
Lola had been in a de facto relationship with a man, “Eric.”85 Lola and Eric had 
met in her home country of Brazil, when she was a seventeen-year-old student 
and he was a thirty-two-year-old wealthy businessman. He approached her on 
the beach, and even though she did not speak English or French and he did not 
speak Portuguese, he persisted in his courtship of her. Soon after, their 10-year 
relationship began. Lola eventually left her home country—against her parents’ 
wishes—and immigrated to Eric’s province of Quebec after he promised he would 
“take care” of her (and even though she had just barely finished high school). 
He would later testify that although he “knew she was young,” he “wanted to act 
as her guide.”86
Lola and Eric lived together for seven years and had three children. The 
couple was on-and-off again due to his drug use and infidelity. One time he 
attempted to send her back to Brazil, before the couple eventually reconciled. 
During another period in their relationship, Lola left Eric to pursue a modelling 
career in London. He eventually tracked her down and begged her to return to 
Montreal (shortly after, their first child was born). Throughout all of this, Lola 
wanted to get married and frequently asked Eric to do so. Eric testified that he 
rebuffed her requests for “professional reasons,” because he “wanted to protect” 
his business.87 Strangely, at one point, he proposed to her on New Year’s Eve, 
only to subsequently claim it was a joke. Lola eventually moved out—one of 
the last straws had been when, two months after the birth of their third child, 
Eric disappeared onto his yacht to begin a relationship with a dancer from New 
York.88 Lola subsequently challenged the Civil Code’s exclusion of her from the 
spousal support and property-sharing benefits that extended to spouses who 
entered marriage or a civil union.
The point of spending a paragraph to tell Lola’s story is not to dwell on the 
salacious details of her relationship with Eric—nor is it to demonize Eric or 
85. The couple’s real names were not used in the proceedings, but the case is widely known in 
Quebec as the Eric and Lola case. Margot Young has pointed out that even the selection 
of these two names may raise issues of gender equality, given that Lola may pack for many, 
as she puts it, “gendered baggage,” while Eric is relatively neutral and does not bring to bear 
the same sort of sexist connotations as Lola does. See Lawrence, supra note 77. Nonetheless, 
for the reader’s ease, I have opted to refer to the two by these media-given names, as opposed 
to the Court’s less-intuitive designation of “A” and “B” (the “A” in Quebec v A being “Lola”).
86. Martin Patriquin, “A billionaire, the law, his Brazilian ex,” Maclean’s (19 February 2009) 
online: <www.macleans.ca/news/canada/a-billionaire-the-law-his-brazilian-ex>.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
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valorize Lola—but rather to highlight in stark terms how completely ineffective 
stereotypes and prejudice are in determining whether the law at issue was 
discriminatory. Whether Justice LeBel is correct, and modern perceptions of 
married versus non-married women have changed in Quebec to the point that 
unmarried woman who live with a man are no longer viewed in a negative manner 
(which to me is debatable), is irrelevant.89 The power dynamics in relationships 
between men and women have historically been slanted towards men, and very 
much remain so today. Lola’s vulnerability and dependency as a teenaged girl 
who was persuaded into a relationship by a much older, more sophisticated, and 
powerful man in a country far removed from her own does not become evident 
unless a contextual inquiry into her specific circumstances is conducted. That 
analysis must extend to examining continuing systematic disadvantages that 
women like Lola face following separation, taking into account the fact that 
woman generally encounter greater social and economic barriers following the 
dissolution of their relationships than men. As the Court itself admitted in an 
earlier case, “the feminization of poverty is an entrenched social phenomenon,” 
one that is only exacerbated following divorce and separation.90 The gendered 
division of labour typically results in a role for women maintaining the household 
and caring for children, excluding them from the labour force and preventing 
them from building their own capital and career qualifications.91 Even though de 
facto spouses in these circumstances have not entered into a formal union, they are 
no less dependent on their partners than their married counterparts: “they form 
long-standing relationships; they divide household responsibilities and develop 
a high degree of interdependence.”92 Following the dissolution of a union with 
89. In any event, demonstrating stereotyping and prejudice that rises to the level of “public 
opprobrium” or “social ostracism” is an overly onerous threshold to meet. See Quebec v A, 
supra note 5 at para 249.
90. Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813, 99 DLR (4th) 456 [Moge cited to SCR].
91. Quebec v A, supra note 5 at para 300.
92. Ibid at para 284. Similarly, the Court held in Moge that mandating spousal support 
“recognize[s] and account[s] for both the economic disadvantages incurred by the spouse 
who makes such sacrifices and the economic advantages conferred upon the other spouse.” 
Moge, supra note 94 at 864. In Bracklow v Bracklow, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) 
confirmed that support obligations are protective, by underlining the interdependencies 
created by marriage, and “recogniz[ing] the reality that when people cohabit over a period 
of time in a family relationship, their affairs may become intermingled and impossible 
to disentangle neatly.” See Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420 at para 31, 169 DLR 
(4th) 577. In Quebec v A, Justice Abella cited these two former judgments to explain that 
the need underpinning the rationale behind spousal support “is conceptually applicable 
as much to de facto relationships as to marriages and civil unions.”  See Quebec v A, supra 
note 5 at para 298.
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their partners, de facto spouses are similarly just as economically vulnerable as 
their married counterparts (or those in civil unions). Yet, simply because these de 
facto spouses did not consent to enter into a formally created union (for reasons 
that may in large part relate to an additional layer of vulnerabilities not faced by 
that those who are in a position to consent to a formal union), the law does not 
offer them the protection that their formally married counterparts have.
Justice LeBel’s conclusion that de facto spouses no longer face stigma in 
modern-day Quebec demonstrated why a narrowed focus on prejudice and 
stereotype completely failed to capture the more complex elements of Lola’s 
discrimination claim. A number of other elements provide persuasive support 
for a finding of discrimination when one looks outside the box of prejudice and 
stereotype: the law at issue created effects that exacerbated the historic disadvantage 
experienced by unmarried individuals, impacted women disproportionately, and 
failed to respond to the actual needs of people based on their marital status, 
as opposed to the arbitrary titles they bear as “married,” in a “civil union,” 
or merely a “de facto spouse.” By making stereotypes and prejudice the focus of 
section 15, the dissent would have retreated even further into formalism—for 
which the Court was criticized in Law—by erecting needless barriers that fail to 
serve the goal of substantive equality.
In contrast, Justice Abella’s more probing, comprehensive examination of 
the reality facing unmarried women post-separation was much more effective at 
capturing the discriminatory effects of the Civil Code on Lola and women like 
her. Even though society may not have viewed Lola with any prejudice or in a 
stereotypical manner because of her situation, Lola nonetheless suffered from the 
adverse effects of legislation that prevented her from receiving the same spousal 
support as a married woman would in her situation. Those effects only serve to 
exacerbate the disadvantage that unmarried women have faced economically and 
socially both historically and in the present day. Since this type of vulnerability 
could arise regardless of whether the woman was formally married or simply a de 
facto spouse, the Civil Code’s distinction was discriminatory: it bears no relation 
to ensuring that the more-economically disadvantaged and vulnerable spouse is 
protected following a divorce or separation. As Justice Abella stated: “The right to 
support—and the obligation to pay it—did not rest on the legal status of either 
husband or wife, but on the reality of the dependence or vulnerability that the 
spousal relationship had created.”93 If the purpose of section 15 is “to eliminate 
the exclusionary barriers faced by individuals in the enumerated or analogous 
93. Ibid at para 296.
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groups,”94 then all an individual should need to show is what Andrews originally 
required: That a distinction created by a law perpetuates disadvantage for the 
group or individual. And that is exactly what Justice Abella’s approach asked.
For those seeking a comprehensive approach to section 15, one that is more 
sensitive to rooting out substantive inequality in all its forms, Justice Abella’s 
judgment in Quebec v A is encouraging. Justice Abella had effectively untethered 
the concept of disadvantage from the concepts of prejudice and stereotypes, such 
that other routes of proving the existence of disadvantage could be sufficient to 
demonstrate discrimination.95
At the same time, it upended what has been the accepted section 15 test 
since 2008, when Kapp led most of the legal community to believe that the 
existence of stereotype of prejudice was a necessary precondition to making out a 
successful section 15 claim. The precedential impact of Justice Abella’s judgment 
is made all the murkier because its 5-4 split on the section 15 issue was coupled 
with a finding against Lola (due to one of Justice Abella’s five siding with Justice 
LeBel in his holding that any infringements were justified under section 1). The 
impact of decisions with such deep fractures and irreconcilable positions at the 
SCC are always uncertain. To exacerbate issues, Quebec v A is a whopping 450 
paragraphs, making its takeaways even more difficult to parse out.
As a result, many were uncertain of what the test for section 15 should be in 
the wake of Quebec v A. Did stereotypes and prejudice have to be demonstrated? 
If not, then what is needed instead to demonstrate that a disadvantage is 
discriminatory? Is classifying a disadvantage as discriminatory even what the 
Court is looking for, given its use—twice—of the phrase “arbitrary disadvantage”? 
Is the use of the new term “arbitrary disadvantage” intentional? Or is it the result, 
as some mused, of a “slip of the pen”?96
B. THE RETURN TO SYSTEMIC DISADVANTAGE AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE: 
TAYPOTAT
It was not until two years after Quebec v A that the SCC offered up some answers 
to these pressing questions in the form of its judgment in Taypotat. In Taypotat, 
Justice Abella picked up where she left off in Quebec v A, confirming the current 
approach to section 15 in six succinct paragraphs. These six paragraphs elucidated 
94. Ibid at para 319.
95. Brunelle, supra note 88 at 75-76.
96. Jennifer Koshan, “‘Arbitrary Disadvantage’: A Slip of the Pen or Something 
More?” (18 June 2014), ABlawg.ca (blog), online: <ablawg.ca/2014/06/18/
arbitrary-disadvantage-a-slip-of-the-pen-or-something-more>.
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that section 15 remains geared at protecting substantive equality.97  The analytical 
approach, she asserted, recognizes that certain groups in society have historically 
been subject to “persistent systemic disadvantages.”98 The approach therefore 
censures laws that draw discriminatory distinctions, that is, distinctions that 
perpetuate “arbitrary disadvantage” based on an individual’s membership in an 
enumerated or analogous group. The analysis into discriminatory or arbitrary 
disadvantage, Justice Abella reminded us, must be “flexible and contextual,” 
taking into account “the social and economic context in which a claim of 
inequality arises.”99
Although Justice Abella did not delineate a list of specific factors that may 
be considered in determining whether substantive equality has been violated, she 
did pay particular attention to a single factor: historical disadvantage. She linked 
arbitrary disadvantage to whether a distinction “perpetuates” disadvantage by 
“recogniz[ing] that persistent systemic disadvantages have operated to limit the 
opportunities available to members of certain groups in society.”100 Accordingly, 
the section 15 inquiry seeks to narrow the gap between disadvantaged and 
advantaged groups by denouncing conduct that “imposes burdens or denies a 
benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating 
their disadvantage.”101 This approach harkens back to Law, which relied on the 
language of “pre-existing disadvantage” to ensure section 15 protection extended 
to members of groups who were historically disadvantaged relative to other 
groups in society.
While the door seems open to consider other contextual factors in the flexible 
inquiry Justice Abella called for, historical disadvantage is clearly a central one. 
It is the only factor that she explicitly identifies as demonstrating the existence 
of arbitrary or discriminatory disadvantage. The decision to focus on historical 
disadvantage may have simply been a result of the facts of Taypotat, rather than 
a conscious decision to make historical disadvantage the new starting point of 
the second stage of the section 15 inquiry. Taypotat involved a challenge to the 
Kahkewistahaw First Nation’s Election Code, which included a Grade Twelve 
completion requirement for candidates who wished to be Chief or a Band 
Councilor. Louis Taypotat—who had been Chief for around three decades but 
was only educated up until Grade Ten—was disqualified from running again 
97. Taypotat, supra note 8 at paras 16-21.
98. Ibid at para 17.
99. Ibid at paras 16, 18.
100. Ibid at para 17.
101. Ibid at para 20.
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for office as a result. As Taypotat was a seventy-six-year old, residential school 
survivor, who had spent his life living on reserve, this case readily engaged issues 
of historical disadvantage and can neatly be framed as a claim within historical 
indicia of discrimination.
Alternatively, Justice Abella may have paid particular attention to historical 
disadvantage because of its link to what she describes as the “root of s. 15,” 
that is “our awareness that certain groups have been historically discriminated 
against, and that the perpetuation of such discrimination should be curtailed.”102 
As Colleen Sheppard points out, focusing on historical disadvantage recognizes 
“the historical realities of inequality and discrimination in Canadian Society,” and 
ameliorating historical disadvantage redresses the exclusion and mistreatment 
of specific social groups.103 Perhaps what Justice Abella was signaling is that 
understanding section 15 in relation to historical disadvantage helps ensure that 
constitutional equality protections remain focused on systemic disadvantages. 
After all, the constitutional protection for equality is generally framed “without 
reference to historical patterns of social disadvantage” in a manner that does not 
reflect the “underlying logic of substantive equality,” which is “deeply challenged 
when members of historically privileged groups ... allege discrimination.”104 
Historical disadvantage may simply be, in Justice Abella’s eyes, a powerful shortcut 
to ensure that the section remains focused on redressing the harm experienced by 
those groups that are socially disadvantaged in the present-day on the basis that 
they are generally the same groups that were socially disadvantaged historically.
C. LINGERING QUESTIONS FOLLOWING QUEBEC V A AND TAYPOTAT
Taypotat is a welcome companion case to Quebec v A, because it corroborated 
Quebec v A’s approach to discrimination in more unequivocal terms and 
reinforced that an analysis of discrimination must be contextual. Moreover, the 
change is made all the more significant because Justice Abella brought the whole 
Court with her; Taypotat was a unanimous decision, not the 5-4 split we saw 
in Quebec v A that threw the broader applicability of Quebec v A into question. 
Finally, Taypotat also confirmed that Justice Abella’s repeated use of the term 
“arbitrary” in connection with section 15 was a deliberate move.
However, for all the issues Taypotat resolved, it raised just as many. First, 
Quebec v A and Taypotat are complex decisions, filled with a number of concepts 
102. Ibid at para 20.
103. Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in 
Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 40-41.
104. Ibid.
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that are both new and that draw from the prior jurisprudence. For example, 
the decisions introduced the term “arbitrary disadvantage” and reintroduced 
the notion of a multi-factorial approach from Law, all while underlining the 
notion that the section 15 inquiry must be flexible and case-by-case. Thus, a key 
question is how rights claimants and courts will choose to unpack the many 
takeaways from Quebec v A and Taypotat, and specifically which aspects of the 
decisions they will hone in on.
Second, the role of stereotyping and prejudice remains arguably ambiguous. 
Despite Justice Abella’s strong admonishment against the use of stereotypes and 
prejudice as required elements of the section 15 approach in Quebec v A, her 
decision in Taypotat did not refer to either term once, which implicitly may 
indicate  that a section 15 analysis can be conducted without the claimant raising 
these requirements. However, given that Louis Taypotat did not in fact succeed in 
his claim, Taypotat is hardly a ringing endorsement for the notion that section 15 
infringement can be demonstrated without reliance on the presence of prejudice 
or stereotypes. Similarly, considering the Court’s split in Quebec v A on the issue 
of the necessity of prejudice and stereotype, a clear statement delivered by the 
unanimous court in Taypotat to the effect that they are not required would have 
been helpful for future section 15 claimants and lower courts. Therefore, there 
is uncertainty relating to how courts will choose to approach the residual role 
of stereotype and prejudice in the section 15 inquiry, owing to the somewhat 
uncertain state of these two factors.
Third, the repeated use of the word “arbitrary” as touchstone for the test 
for discrimination is a new development, the impact of which is not yet clear. 
Protecting against arbitrary disadvantage now lies at the heart of the section 
15 inquiry. Curiously, Justice Abella’s definition of arbitrariness as the failure 
of a law to “respond to the actual capacities and needs of the members of a 
group”105 echoes the “correspondence” factor of Law, which asked whether there 
is a correspondence between the impugned legislation and “the actual needs, 
capacity, or circumstances of the claimant or others with similar traits.”106 
Justice Abella, however, did not explain what she hoped to achieve with the 
switch from the more commonly used phrase of “discriminatory disadvantage” 
to “arbitrary disadvantage.”
The two words certainly have different connotations. The Oxford English 
Dictionary describes the term “discrimination” as the “[u]njust or prejudicial 
treatment of a person or group, esp. on the grounds of race, gender, sexual 
105. Taypotat, supra note 8 at para 20.
106. Law, supra note 2 at para 70.
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orientation, etc.”107 “Discrimination” therefore sets the inquiry up as a 
comparative one, asking whether certain groups are treated in an unfair manner 
compared to others. In contrast, arbitrariness is not dependent on a comparative 
exercise between groups of people, and instead is associated with irrationality. The 
Oxford English Dictionary explains that arbitrariness is “[t]o be decided by one’s 
liking; dependent upon will or pleasure; at the discretion or option of anyone.”108 
Therefore, there seems to be an analytical separation between arbitrariness and 
discrimination that is not explained in Taypotat. Furthermore, arbitrariness 
carries a specific meaning in section 7 jurisprudence under the principles of 
fundamental justice, and injecting it into the section 15 analytical framework 
may import connotations of the term from its use in section 7. To comlicate 
matters, Justice Abella used arbitrariness both as a qualifier for disadvantage—
that is, a law violates section 15 when it creates an “arbitrary disadvantage”—as 
well as a synonym for “discriminatory,” leading to a lack of both rigour and 
clarity regarding what this pivotal term is intended to mean within the section 15 
framework. All this points to the third question of how courts will interpret the 
meaning of “arbitrary” in its application to section 15.
Fourth, Justice Abella urged in Quebec v A and Taypotat for the section 15 
analysis to proceed in a flexible manner that takes into account all relevant factors 
based on the context of the case. Other than noting that section 15 claims may 
be mounted when the factor of historical disadvantage is present, Justice Abella 
did not detail what other factors courts may consider in asking whether a law is 
discriminatory or arbitrary. The fourth question therefore asks what factors courts 
have turned to in guiding them in their contextual inquiry into a section 15 claim.
III. A LOOK AT THE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE WAKE OF 
QUEBEC V A AND TAYPOTAT
In an attempt to clarify the four questions broached in Part II(C), above, I have 
conducted a review of all section 15 cases decided after Quebec v A and Taypotat 
up until the writing of this article, in order to determine how these two decisions 
have been interpreted by lower courts.
The methodology involved searching the Westlaw and Quicklaw databases 
for all cases that have considered either one of or both Quebec v A and Taypotat. 
Cases were initially identified because they contained at least one reference to 
Quebec v A or Taypotat; the pool was subsequently reviewed to select only those 
107. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed, sub verbo “discrimination”.
108. Ibid sub verbo “arbitrary”.
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cases that have applied Quebec v A or Taypotat for their formulation of the s 15(1) 
test. Although there was no start date per se, because of the timing of the release 
of Quebec v A and Taypotat, the pool includes cases that start in 2013 (when 
Quebec v A was released), up until a cut-off of 30 November 2016. Thirty-three 
cases in total have considered Quebec v A after the decision was rendered, while 
an additional eleven have considered both Quebec v A and Taypotat in the context 
of applying section 15.109
I begin first with a short quantitative analysis of the jurisprudence as a 
whole, to determine whether courts have tended to adopt Quebec v A/Taypotat, 
or whether they have been resistant to recognizing stereotype and prejudice as 
non-mandatory elements of the section 15 analysis.110 I also ask whether there 
is a correlation between a section 15 approach focused strictly on stereotype/
prejudice versus a multifactorial, contextual approach, and a claimant’s success in 
showing prima facie discrimination. I then conclude with a qualitative discussion 
of specific decisions to elucidate how courts have interpreted and applied the 
changes introduced by Quebec v A and Taypotat, structured according to the four 
questions posed in Part II(C), above.
A. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE POST-QUEBEC V A 
AND -TAYPOTAT
1. COURTS ARE INCONSISTENT AS TO WHETHER PREJUDICE AND 
STEREOTYPE ARE REQUIRED IN THE SECTION 15 INQUIRY
While Justice Abella made clear in Quebec v A that stereotype and prejudice 
are no longer mandatory to show discrimination, in Taypotat, she rendered an 
entire section 15 analysis without mentioning either term once. It is from this 
omission that I draw my concern, raised in Part II(C), above, that courts may not 
109. A total of fifteen cases in fact considered Taypotat. However, only eleven of these cases 
are discussed as the remaining four considered Taypotat in the context of evidentiary 
requirements, rather than in the context of section 15.
110. In presenting the quantitative analysis, I refer the reader to the very apt comments of Sujit 
Choudhry and Claire E Hunter, in conducting their own quantitative review of Charter 
decisions. As they point out, a quantitative approach runs the danger of reductionism, such 
that variables that can be easily measured are divorced from the framework of constitutional 
adjudication or the facts and idiosyncratic features of the individual cases themselves. The 
understanding of what is happening in these cases is incomplete, rendering the usefulness 
of the analysis limited and subject to significant caveats. See Sujit Choudhry & Claire E 
Hunter, “Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on 
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE” (2003) 48:3 McGill LJ 525 at 533-34.
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necessarily be clear on whether prejudice and stereotype continue to be required 
for section 15.
A review of all post-Quebec v A section 15 decisions indicates that this 
concern is more than theoretical. A number of courts have continued to apply 
the requirement of stereotype or prejudice stemming from Kapp and Withler 
(Table 1). Of the thirty-three cases that considered Quebec v A but not Taypotat, 
fifteen (45 per cent) stated that the Kapp/Wither test requiring prejudice and 
stereotyping is the current approach to section 15, and restricted their section 
15 analysis on the facts to evidence of prejudice and stereotype accordingly.111 
In contrast, seventeen out of the thirty-three cases (55 per cent) recognized that 
following Quebec v A, stereotype and prejudice are no longer required elements of 
the section 15 inquiry, and accordingly applied a broader test for discrimination.112
111. See 156158 Canada Inc v Quebec (Attorney General), 2016 QCCS 1676 at paras 72, 77, 266 
ACWS (3d) 81 [156158 Canada]; Droit de la famille – 16244, 2016 QCCS 410 at paras 76, 
80, 263 ACWS (3d) 981 [16244]; Tan v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 907 at para 
53, 257 ACWS (3d) 181 [Tan]; Gehl v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 ONSC 3481 at 
para 80, 255 ACWS (3d) 2 [Gehl]; Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users v British Columbia 
(Human Rights Tribunal), 2015 BCSC 534 at paras 51-53, 385 DLR (4th) 530 [Drug Users]; 
M(S) c Québec (Ministre de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale), 2015 QCCS 345 at para 61, 
252 ACWS (3d) 695 [M(S)]; R v McKenzie-Sinclair, 2015 MBPC 5 at para 132, 313 Man 
R (2d) 122 [McKenzie-Sinclair]; S(VA) v Grace, 2014 ABQB 666 at para 103, 248 ACWS 
(3d) 719 [S(VA)]; Gichuru v Law Society (British Columbia), 2014 BCCA 396 at para 102, 
64 BCLR (5th) 1 [Gichuru BCCA]; R v Chambers, 2014 YKCA 13 at para 115, 116 WCB 
(2d) 555 [Chambers YKCA]; Jewish Family and Child Service of Toronto v Z(J), 2014 ONCJ 
119 at paras 167-68, 183, 242 ACWS (3d) 851 [Jewish Family]; Joseph v Dzawada’enuxw 
(Tsawataineuk) First Nation Band Council, 2013 FC 974 at para 41, 235 ACWS (3d) 2 
[Joseph]; Taypotat v Taypotat, 2013 FCA 192 at para 44, 365 DLR (4th) 485 [Taypotat 
FCA]; R v Bidal, 2013 ONCJ 287 at paras 22-23, 107 WCB (2d) 260 [Bidal]; Tabingo v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 377 at paras 118, 362, 362 DLR 
(4th) 166 [Tabingo].
112. See Madeley, supra note 10 at paras 136-43; R v Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 278 at paras 82-84, 
125 OR (3d) 321 [Nguyen]; R v B(TM), 2013 ONSC 4019 at paras 46-47, 4 CR (7th) 
378 [B(TM)]; Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v F(K), 2015 ONSC 7580 at para 40, 261 
ACWS (3d) 583 [F(K)]; R v Shenandoah, 2015 ONCJ 541 at paras 43-44, 126 WCB 
(2d) 15 [Shenandoah]; R v Daybutch, 2015 ONCJ 302 at paras 84-88, 335 CRR (2d) 188 
[Daybutch]; Quebec (Attorney General) c 156158 Canada Inc (Boulangerie Maxie’s), 2015 
QCCQ 354 at paras 266-70, 334 CRR (2d) 117 [Boulangerie Maxie’s]; Barbra Schlifer 
Commemorative Clinic v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 5140 at paras 84-85, 
121 OR (3d) 733 [Barbra Schlifer]; Hay v Ontario (Human Rights Tribunal), 2014 ONSC 
2858 at paras 91-93, 121 OR (3d) 103 [Hay]; R v Nero, 2014 ONSC 1896 at para 22, 304 
CRR (2d) 320 [Nero]; R v Chambers, 2013 YKTC 77 at paras 157-58, 296 CRR (2d) 111 
[Chambers YKTC]; R v Adamo, 2013 MBQB 225 at paras 127-29, 296 Man R (2d) 245 
[Adamo]; Scott v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 BCSC 1651 at paras 82-83, 232 ACWS 
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL694
Of those cases that considered both Quebec v A and Taypotat, a larger 
majority (64 per cent) embraced the new approach to section 15,113 while 36 
per cent continued to regard prejudice and stereotype as required elements of 
discrimination.114 This increase is a promising one compared to the jurisprudence 
that considered Quebec v A alone, where only roughly half of lower courts 
applied the new approach. Perhaps as courts have more time to adjust to the 
shift in analytical focus of section 15, they will begin to show an increasing 
willingness to adopt it.
TABLE 1: HAVE POST-QUEBEC V A/TAYPOTAT CASES REQUIRED EVIDENCE OF 
PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPE?
Total 
Number
Applied Kapp/Withler and 
Required Prejudice and 
Stereotype
Applied Quebec v A/
Taypotat and Did Not 
Require Prejudice and 
Stereotype
Considered Quebec 
v A but not Taypotat 33 15 (45 per cent) 18 (55 per cent)
Considered Quebec 
v A and Taypotat 11 4 (36 per cent) 7 (64 per cent)
Total 44 19 (43 per cent) 25 (57 per cent)
(3d) 878 [Scott cited to BCSC]; Gichuru v Law Society (British Columbia), 2013 BCSC 1325 
at para 84-85, 230 ACWS (3d) 878 [Gichuru BCSC]; Gyorffy v Drury, 2013 ONSC 1929 
at para 39, 116 OR (3d) 387 [Gyorffy]; R v Hall, 2013 ONSC 834 at para 11, 114 OR (3d) 
393 [Hall]; R v Bittern, 2014 MBPC 51 at para 102, 109-12, 313 Man R (2d) 221 [Bittern].
113. See Sherbrooke, supra note 88 at paras 47-50, 53-54; R v Ejigu, 2016 BCSC 1487 at paras 
149-53, 132 WCB (2d) 430 [Ejigu]; IAFF, Local 268 v Adekayode, 2016 NSCA 6 at paras 
67-68, 77-78, 394 DLR (4th) 416 [Adekayode]; Association des juristes de l’État c Ménard, 
2015 QCCS 5546 at paras 24-25, 262 ACWS (3d) 177 [Ménard]; Catholic Children, supra 
note 4 at paras 49, 52-55; Descheneaux c Canada (Procureur Général), 2015 QCCS 3555 at 
para 117, 259 ACWS (3d) 601 [Descheneaux]; Muggah v Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation 
Appeals Tribunal), 2015 NSCA 63 at paras 44-45, 362 NSR (2d) 201 [Muggah].
114. Thomson v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 985 at paras 87-89, 260 ACWS (3d) 384 
[Thomson]; Carbone v Whidden, 2015 ABCA 255 at para 43, 257 ACWS (3d) 971 [Carbone]; 
Abbotsford (City) v Shantz, 2015 BCSC 1909 at paras 226, 235, 392 DLR (4th) 106 
[Shantz]; YZ v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892 at paras 104, 123, 387 
DLR (4th) 676 [YZ].
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AAnother interesting finding from my survey of post-Quebec v A/Taypotat 
jurisprudence is that there is a correlation between the eventual success of a 
claimant’s section 15 claim, and the likelihood that a court required a showing 
of prejudice and stereotype (Table 2). A breach of section 15 was found in only 
20 per cent of decisions applying the Kapp/Withler requirement for prejudice 
and stereotype;115 while the remaining 80 per cent failed.116 In contrast, those 
courts that applied a broader test for section 15 that considered other indicators 
of disadvantage were more likely to find a section 15 infringement, with 64 per 
cent of decisions making a finding of prima facie discrimination,117 and only 36 
per cent rejecting the claim on section 15 grounds.118
TABLE 2: HAVE SECTION 15 CLAIMS SUCCEEDED MORE OR LESS FREQUENTLY IN 
CASES THAT REQUIRED EVIDENCE OF PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPE?
Required Prejudice and 
Stereotype
Did Not Require Prejudice 
and Stereotype
S 15 Infringed 4 (20 per cent) 16 (64 per cent)
S 15 Not Infringed 15 (80 per cent) 9 (36 per cent)
The relatively higher success rate of section 15 claims under the Quebec v 
A/Taypotat approach, as compared to the Kapp/Withler approach, may in part 
115. See Thomson, supra note 121 at para 94; Carbone, supra note 121 at para 43; Shantz, supra 
note 121 at para 236; Drug Users, supra note 118 at para 143; Joseph, supra note 118 at para 
58; Taypotat FCA, supra note 118 at paras 54-60.
116. See YZ, supra note 121 at para 128; 156158 Canada, supra note 118 at para 77; 16244, supra 
note 118 at para 80; Tan, supra note 118 at para 54; Gehl, supra note 118 at para 82; M(S), 
supra note 118 at paras 81-83; McKenzie-Sinclair, supra note 118 at para 141; S(VA), supra 
note 118 at paras 103-04; Gichuru BCCA, supra note 118 at para 106; Chambers YKCA, 
supra note 118 at paras 127-28; Jewish Family, supra note 118 at paras 167-68, 198-99; 
Bidal, supra note 118 at para 27; Tabingo, supra note 118 at para 135.
117. Sherbrooke, supra note 88 at para 55; Ejigu, supra note 120 at para 262; Adekayode, supra note 
120 at paras 67-68, 77-78, 102; Ménard, supra note 120 at para 58; Catholic Children, supra 
note 4 at paras 80, 89-93; Descheneaux, supra note 120 at paras 172-73; Madeley, supra note 
10 at para 171; Nguyen, supra note 119 at paras 91-93; Daybutch, supra note 119 at para 101; 
Nero, supra note 119 at para 22; Chambers YKTC, supra note 119 at paras 171-75; Adamo, 
supra note 119 at paras 139-42, 147; Scott, supra note 119 at para 95; Gyorffy, supra note 119 
at para 40; Hall, supra note 119 at paras 18-19; Bittern, supra note 119 at para 114.
118. Muggah, supra note 120 at para 56; B(TM), supra note 119 at para 64; F(K), supra note 119 
at para 69; Shenandoah, supra note 119 at para 67; Boulangerie Maxie’s, supra note 119 at para 
282; Barbra Schlifer, supra note 119 at paras 118-19; Hay, supra note 119 at paras 105, 110; 
Gichuru BCSC, supra note 119 at para 87.
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be explained by the former test’s ability to achieve what Justice Abella hoped it 
would: A removal of burdens on section 15 claimants by expanding the categories 
into which a claim of discrimination may fit.119 Alternatively, these results may 
simply be a consequence of courts tailoring their section 15 approaches to the 
relative strength of the section 15 claim at hand. That is, some courts may have 
simply decided to do a less fulsome section 15 inquiry because they felt that the 
section 15 claims were weak from the outset. In any event, these findings suggest 
that claimants are far better off in presenting their section 15 claims in a manner 
that raises the entirety of the relevant context, rather than focusing said claims 
on the factors of stereotypes and prejudice, as the former type of claim is more 
likely to succeed.
B. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS APPLYING KAPP AND WITHLER
Before I turn to examining decisions of courts that have applied the new Quebec 
v A and Taypotat approach, I would like to first examine those decisions that have 
not. Although over half of the post-Quebec v A/Taypotat decisions have applied 
the approach from Taypotat, as discussed in Part III(A), above; a large proportion 
have nonetheless elected to apply the Kapp/Withler version of the test, which 
requires a demonstration of prejudice or stereotype. Oddly, courts have done 
so despite themselves making reference to Quebec v A and Taypotat, indicating 
that these courts are aware of the decisions but have refused to acknowledge the 
changes advocated therein.
For example, in Thomson, Justice Gascon of the Federal Court began by 
quoting from Withler and Justice LeBel’s dissent in Quebec v A to support 
his conclusion that the section 15 test requires a distinction that creates “a 
disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotypes.”120 Although Justice 
Gascon also cited the full approach to section 15 as articulated by Justice Abella 
in Taypotat, he then proceeded to consider whether prejudice or stereotypes were 
perpetuated on the facts of the case. Justice Gascon concluded that the answer 
was no, because there was no prejudice that led to the conclusion “that the person 
is not an equal member of Canadian society, is deserving of less worth, or does 
not belong with the rest of us.”121 It is curious that while Justice Gascon was 
mindful of Justice Abella’s caution in Taypotat to apply a broad, flexible approach 
to section 15, he still limited himself to an approach focusing exclusively on 
119. Quebec v A, supra note 5 at paras 329-30.
120. Thomson, supra note 121 at para 88.
121. YZ, supra note 121 at para 98.
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the presence of stereotype and prejudice (and one that referenced Justice LeBel’s 
Quebec v A dissent, no less).
The Federal Court mimicked its approach in Thomson in the subsequent case 
of YZ. Once again, the Federal Court quoted extensively from Justice Abella’s 
judgment in Taypotat,122 but then instead applied the test for equality from 
Withler. Justice Boswell of the Federal Court decided that the law at issue in that 
case, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act123 was discriminatory on its face 
because it prejudiced refugees from designated countries of origin. Furthermore, 
the law was also held to be based on the stereotype that refugees from these 
countries are queue-jumping or “bogus” claimants that come to Canada to take 
advantage of its generosity.124 Justice Boswell’s decision in YZ is therefore more 
defensible than Justice Gascon’s in Thomson because the claim in YZ succeeded 
on stereotype and prejudice alone, and thus, arguably, it was unnecessary to 
extend the analysis to other factors. Nonetheless, the decision would have been 
more compelling and more in line with the Court’s post-Quebec v A/Taypotat 
jurisprudence had Justice Boswell in the very least mentioned that stereotypes 
and prejudice are sufficient factors— but no longer the only factors necessary—
to demonstrate discrimination.
In Carbone, the Alberta Court of Appeal followed a similar tack to the Federal 
Court by referencing the Taypotat decision but choosing to apply the Kapp 
requirement for prejudice and stereotypes.125 Justice Anderson decided that there 
was no section 15 breach because there was no evidence on the record that the 
appellant had been prejudiced.126 Much like Thomson, the decision is troubling 
due to its failure to consider factors outside of stereotyping and prejudice, 
while still disallowing the claimant’s section 15 claim. Had the Court of Appeal 
canvassed a broader range of factors that can be used to indicate discrimination, 
the outcome may have been different for the claimant.
Even more troubling are decisions such as that of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court in Shantz. In Shantz, Chief Justice Hinkson completely ignored 
the test from Taypotat and instead stated that the “current” framework for section 
15 “used by courts today” is that from Kapp, which requires a demonstration of 
disadvantage perpetuated by prejudice or stereotyping.127 Chief Justice Hinkson 
122. See ibid at para 116.
123. SC 2001, c 27.
124. YZ, supra note 121 at para 124.
125. Carbone, supra note 121.
126. Ibid at para 43.
127. Shantz, supra note 121 at para 226.
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signaled his awareness of Taypotat through his use of the decision as support 
for the proposition that comparator groups are not necessary in analyzing 
section 15,128 yet inexplicably failed to even mention Justice Abella’s modified 
formulation of the approach to discrimination.
What is interesting about the decisions in Thomson, YZ, Carbone, and 
Shantz is that they all deal with section 15 in a perfunctory manner. Rather than 
conducting a fulsome discussion of the test, they all merely devote a paragraph 
or two to reciting the test as stated in Kapp/Withler and then proceed to apply 
the test in a mechanical manner. These decisions indicate that some courts are 
failing to turn their minds to the changes instated by Quebec v A/Taypotat, either 
because they have not yet caught up to the more recent jurisprudence or because 
they are unwilling to engage with this more analytically-demanding, nuanced 
approach when they could simply apply the more straightforward approach from 
Kapp/Withler. Another possible explanation is that the focus on prejudice and 
stereotype in these decisions simply reflects the types of arguments made by the 
claimants themselves.
Either way, the routine application of the Kapp/Withler requirement for 
stereotype and prejudice is patently incorrect in light of Quebec v A/Taypotat and 
does disservice to section 15 claimants. It is also discouraging to see that a large 
proportion (43 per cent) of judges that hear section 15 cases remain faithful to a 
categorical approach requiring stereotype and prejudice, particularly given that 
this approach seems to coincide with a lesser likelihood of success in showing 
section 15 infringement.
C. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS APPLYING QUEBEC V A AND 
TAYPOTAT
More encouraging, however, are those judges who have taken up the changes 
from Quebec v A and Taypotat in earnest and have conducted flexible, contextual 
inquiries that survey a host of factors relevant to the discrimination inquiry. 
Although the changes introduced by Quebec v A and Taypotat may not have 
touched as many courtrooms as one would have hoped, change is clearly afoot.
In this Part, I will discuss findings from lower court decisions that have 
incorporated Quebec v A and Taypotat. I have examined all forty-four decisions, 
organizing their findings according to the four questions posed in Part II(C), 
above, and summarized as follows: First, on what changes to the section 15 
approach introduced by Quebec v A/Taypotat have lower courts focused? Second, 
128. Ibid at para 228.
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although some courts have recognized that prejudice and stereotype are not 
required in the inquiry, what have these courts indicated with regards to the 
continuing role of these factors in determining discrimination? Third, what 
have courts understood to be the meaning of “arbitrary disadvantage”? And 
fourth, what additional contextual factors have courts looked to in determining 
whether substantive equality is violated? By examining post-Quebec v A/Taypotat 
judgments with these questions in mind, I hope to better understand how the 
effects of Quebec v A and Taypotat have played out in practice.
1. THE FOCUS OF THE SECTION 15 INQUIRY FOLLOWING QUEBEC V A/
TAYPOTAT
Courts that have embraced the Quebec v A/Taypotat changes have characterized 
the cases as more than simply doing away with stereotype and prejudice as 
required factors to show discrimination. Rather, courts have seen Quebec v A/
Taypotat as shifting the focus of the section 15 analysis away from a narrow, 
“improper focus” on prejudice and stereotypes to a broader, contextual inquiry.
Where courts have differed is in their understanding of what the new 
analytical focus of section 15 is. For some courts, like the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario and the Court of Appeal of Quebec, “arbitrary disadvantage” serves as 
the “ultimate guide” for prima facie discrimination.129 For others, like the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal, post-Quebec v A/Taypotat analysis places the focus on 
determining whether the norm of substantive equality has been violated,130 
so that a court conducting a section 15 analysis must always “eye the broader vista 
of substantive equality.”131 Still other courts, like the British Columbia Supreme 
Court, have seen the central question to answer as being whether the impugned 
law “widens the gap between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of 
society rather than narrowing it.”132
These observations indicate that courts have not been clear on whether the 
analytical focus of section 15 is promoting “substantive equality,” prohibiting 
“arbitrary disadvantage,” or “narrowing the gap” faced by disadvantaged groups. 
My reading of Quebec v A and Taypotat suggests that Justice Abella continues to 
see substantive equality as the ultimate goal of section 15. Demonstrating that 
a law creates “arbitrary disadvantage” or “widens the gap” are avenues of finding 
a violation of substantive equality, not the ultimate focal points of section 15 
129. See e.g. Nguyen, supra note 119 at paras 82-84, 91; Sherbrooke, supra note 88 at para 54.
130. See e.g. Adekayode, supra note 111 at para 65.
131. Muggah, supra note 120 at para 51.
132. See e.g. Gichuru BCSC, supra note 119 at paras 84-85; Ejigu, supra note 120 at para 153.
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themselves. Therefore, courts on the one hand could be clearer on the relationship 
between these three concepts, because it certainly seems that some courts view 
curtailing “arbitrary disadvantage” and “gap widening” effects as the focus of the 
section 15 inquiry, rather than substantive equality.
On the other hand, these semantic differences appear to be irrelevant 
in practice. Regardless of the terminology used by courts to describe the 
underpinnings of section 15, all have employed the same means of detecting 
discrimination. There is a general consensus that the Quebec v A and Taypotat 
changes have formulated a new test that signals a removal “formalistic obstacles” 
in assessing discrimination claims.133 Moreover, there seems to be an agreement 
that Quebec v A and Taypotat have “fundamentally changed the legal landscape” 
by clarifying that there is no rigid template for approaching section 15 
violations; rather, they must survey contextual factors that will “vary from case 
to case.”134 While earlier jurisprudence “may still inform the analysis of whether 
an impugned law is discriminatory,” there is an understanding that “care must 
be taken not to rely on principles … that are at odds” with Quebec v A and 
Taypotat.135 Specifically, evidence of prejudice and stereotyping that was largely 
seen as required pre-Quebec v A/Taypotat136 has been supplanted by a more 
flexible approach post-Quebec v A/Taypotat.137 Perpetuation of stereotypes or 
prejudice merely constitute factors that may, in some cases, be relevant for the 
purposes of the section 15 analysis as “points of reference.”138 But a contextual 
approach means that judges must survey whichever factors may be relevant to a 
determination of discrimination on the facts of the case before them. And in the 
end, that sort of contextual inquiry seems better suited to achieving substantive 
equality, even if courts are not expressly articulating substantive equality as being 
the ultimate focus of section 15.
133. See e.g. Hay, supra note 119 at para 91; Muggah, supra note 120 at para 44; Adekayode, supra 
note 120 at para 65.
134. Nguyen, supra note 119 at paras 84, 88. See e.g. Chambers YKTC, supra note 119 at para 172.
135. Ejigu, supra note 120 at para 151.
136. See e.g. Chambers YKTC, supra note 119 at para 171; Sherbrooke, supra note 88 
at paras 46-47.
137. See e.g. ibid at para 52; Catholic Children, supra note 4 at paras 48-49, 53.
138. See e.g. Adekayode, supra note 120 at para 66; Catholic Children, supra note 4 at para 48; 
Hall, supra note 119 at para 11; Muggah, supra note 120 at paras 65-66; Sherbrooke, supra 
note 88 at para 66.
 QUEBEC V A AND TAYPOTAT 701
2. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF STEREOTYPE AND PREJUDICE
Among the decisions that have applied Quebec v A and Taypotat to mean that 
stereotype and prejudice are no longer discrete elements of the section 15 test, 
there is general agreement that these two elements may be appropriate evidence 
of discrimination in some cases. In Boulangerie Maxie’s, the Quebec Superior 
Court discussed the implications of Quebec v A within the section 15 inquiry, 
asking whether the decision meant that courts were forbidden from looking at 
whether an impugned law perpetuates prejudice or stereotype.139 Justice Mascia 
concluded that while the Court in Quebec v A had jettisoned the stereotype/
prejudice requirement, the decision did not exclude consideration of those 
factors in section 15.140 Justice Mascia further noted that Quebec v A called for a 
return to a more contextual analysis to determine whether substantive equality 
has been violated; thus he turned his focus to “examining the negative effects of 
the law on a specific group.”141 A prejudice or stereotype-focused inquiry is not 
always amenable to determining whether the negative effects of an impugned law 
rise to the level of discrimination, but in others it may be.142 In Justice Mascia’s 
words: “Context is everything.”143 Certain contexts may lend themselves to other 
indicia of disadvantage outside of stereotype and prejudice, while in others the 
only viable way of assessing whether discrimination violates substantive equality 
is through the use of a prejudice- or stereotype-focused analysis.144
Similarly, in Hay, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice upheld an 
administrative decision of the Human Rights Tribunal that made a finding of 
discrimination after adopting the Kapp/Withler test and not the Quebec v A 
test. Justice Dambrot noted that the approach following Quebec v A required 
determination of whether substantive equality was violated or not.145 But if a 
decision maker determines that there has been substantive inequality on the basis 
of the presence of stereotype and prejudice, those factors are sufficient to ground 
a section 15 infringement. In many cases, the court added, a “more nuanced 
inquiry” may be required to determine whether differential treatment results 
139. Boulangerie Maxie’s, supra note 119 at para 275.
140. Ibid at paras 275-76.
141. Ibid at para 277.
142. Ibid at paras 277-78.
143. Ibid at para 279.
144. Ibid at paras 279-81.
145. Hay, supra note 119 at paras 91-93.
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in discrimination; but again, this more nuanced inquiry need not be applied 
universally if stereotype or prejudice can be shown.146
However, some courts have favoured conducting a comprehensive inquiry 
that surveys prejudice and stereotyping, in addition to other contextual factors, 
before concluding whether there is discrimination or not. In Madeley, Justice 
Paciocco of the Ontario Superior Court recognized that there was “lingering 
disagreement” in Quebec v A regarding the nature of the test from Kapp/
Withler, but stated that “all authorities agree” that section 15 may ask whether 
disadvantage is created through the perpetuation of prejudice or stereotypes.147 
However, he also noted that Justice Abella’s judgment indicates that the “more 
generic question” of whether the distinction perpetuates arbitrary disadvantage 
must be asked.148 For him, all three factors had to be considered; there was no 
possibility of only probing one to the exclusion of the other two, even if a positive 
finding of discrimination was made.
These three decisions reveal that courts have generally taken Quebec v A 
and Taypotat to mean that stereotype and prejudice may be relevant to some 
inquiries into discrimination but only if the context demands it. This option 
is the most accommodating and favourable for claimants, as it allows them to 
bring stereotyping or prejudice into the equation but only where it may assist 
them in their claim. My one concern is that certain judges will prefer to conduct 
inquiries into discrimination that consider all relevant factors raised, as opposed 
to stopping the inquiry as soon as a single factor indicates discrimination (as 
Justice Paciocco did in Madeley). If this type of approach prevails, claimants may 
shoehorn in evidence of stereotypes and prejudice in an attempt to bolster their 
claim, even where these factors may be irrelevant. Thus, it would be preferable if 
future judgments make it apparent that evidence of any single contextual factor 
on its own is sufficient to demonstrate prima facie discrimination.
3. THE MEANING OF “ARBITRARY DISADVANTAGE”
One of the largest changes that commentators have latched on post-Quebec v A/
Taypotat is the use of the term “arbitrary disadvantage.” However, many courts 
have simply not remarked on the meaning of, or even used, this term.149 The 
focus has rather been on the shift to a contextual test that considers numerous 
factors beyond stereotype and prejudice as indicators of disadvantage. Thus, there 
146. Ibid at para 92.
147. Madeley, supra note 10 at paras 49-51.
148. Ibid at para 143.
149. See e.g. Muggah, supra note 120; Descheneaux, supra note 120; Adekayode, supra note 120.
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are a limited number of decisions that have contemplated whether “arbitrary” 
disadvantage is different from “discriminatory” disadvantage.
One notable exception is the Court of Appeal of Quebec’s judgment 
in Sherbrooke. In Sherbrooke, the Court of Appeal concluded that arbitrary 
disadvantage occurs when a group is excluded from a benefit for “no apparent 
reason” or when there is “no rational basis” for legislation making the 
distinction it does.150 On the specific facts of the case, the Court upheld the 
trial judge’s findings that there was discrimination. The measure at issue was a 
university-instituted retirement plan that applied to younger professors but not 
their older colleagues. The plan was discriminatory because it gave a monetary 
benefit to the younger professors without a rational basis for the distinction.151 
The finding of discrimination was also supported by the fact that the measures 
were based entirely on “stereotypes and prejudice whereby individuals lose 
their professional value merely by reaching a certain age, regardless of their 
actual capabilities.”152 Thus, the Court of Appeal of Quebec’s understanding of 
“arbitrary” seemed to coincide with the general dictionary definition of the term: 
conduct that lacks a rational basis.
Two other courts have interpreted arbitrary disadvantage to occur when 
a law’s purpose fails to address the needs of the claimant group. In Madeley, 
Justice Paciocco conducted an inquiry into whether “arbitrary disadvantage” had 
occurred by asking whether the impugned law’s purpose addressed the actual needs 
and circumstances of the claimant group.153 In Catholic Children, Justice Chappel 
of the Ontario Superior Court similarly stated disadvantage that is “arbitrary in 
nature” is assessed by asking “whether the differential treatment appears arbitrary 
taking into consideration the actual needs, capacity and circumstances of the 
claimant or group.”154 Laws that fail to take into account a claimant’s specific 
situation tend to be discriminatory. The inquiry must therefore ask whether the 
distinctions imposed by a law are appropriate with regard to the object of the 
statute, as well as those individuals who would be affected.155
Both the understanding of “arbitrary” as “irrational” espoused by the Court 
of Appeal of Quebec, and the understanding of the term as failing to correspond 
to a claimant’s needs used by the Ontario Superior Court, link the concept of 
150. Sherbrooke, supra note 88 at para 55.
151. Ibid at para 55.
152. Ibid at para 56.
153. Madeley, supra note 10 at para 160.
154. Catholic Children, supra note 4 at para 56
155. Ibid.
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arbitrariness to the purpose of the impugned law. Jennifer Koshan and Jonnette 
Hamilton have raised concerns about this approach because it imports “section 1 
justifications about purposes and means—not impact—into section 15.”156 Their 
worry is that a focus on arbitrariness improperly asks a claimant to demonstrate 
that a law is arbitrary under section 15, rather than asking the government to 
demonstrate that its law is rational under section 1.157
That being said, of the forty-four decisions surveyed, it was only in 
Sherbrooke, Madeley, and Catholic Children that courts erroneously engaged 
with the meaning of “arbitrary.” The vast majority of courts preferred to keep 
the inquiry appropriately fixed on the traditional question of whether a law was 
discriminatory. Therefore, in practice, few courts require claimants to investigate 
the purpose and associated arbitrariness of a law. So long as this remains the 
case—or at the very least, if courts continue to merely allow, rather than 
require claimants to show the arbitrariness of a law as a way of demonstrating 
discrimination—the concern that issues more appropriate for section 1 are being 
brought under section 15 will remain minimal, arising only when claimants 
themselves rely on them.
Still, an overarching goal for future section 15 jurisprudence will be 
untangling linguistic fuzziness. A less opaque definition of “arbitrary disadvantage” 
is needed. Similarly, the link between arbitrary disadvantage and discriminatory 
disadvantage needs to be clarified. Are the two terms meant to be synonymous? 
Or do they entail two different concepts, thereby requiring two different routes 
towards showing a section 15 breach? The post-Quebec v A/Taypotat jurisprudence 
sheds little light onto these issues, given that so few courts that have been willing 
to engage with the term “arbitrary” (possibly because its function is so uncertain).
4. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS OUTSIDE OF STEREOTYPE AND PREJUDICE 
THAT MAY BE CONSIDERED
A wide bevy of factors, outside of the strict existence of prejudice and stereotype, 
have been considered by courts as relevant to the inquiry into discrimination. 
As Quebec v A indicates, historical disadvantage is the most obvious factor, and 
several courts have seized upon it as a marker of inequality. For example, the 
Quebec Superior Court focused almost exclusively on the historical disadvantage 
factor in Descheneaux, which was one of the first cases decided post-Taypotat, and 
156. Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Kahkewistahaw First Nation v Taypotat: 
An Arbitrary Approach to Discrimination” SCLR [Forthcoming], online <ssrn.com/
abstract=2847911> [Hamilton & Koshan, “Arbitrary”].
157. Ibid at 19-20.
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is interesting because of how differently the court paints the test for section 15 
versus how it actually applies it. Justice Masse begins her section 15 analysis by 
citing the Kapp test as the “established” approach to section 15.158 However, she 
then cites Taypotat in the subsequent paragraph, and while she does not paraphrase 
the decision, her judgment underlines a number of passages addressing the need 
for the inquiry to focus on evidence of historical disadvantage.159 Her analysis 
then goes on to consider whether the impugned legislation granted a benefit to 
“an already privileged group … while refusing groups that have historically been 
victims of discrimination.”160
For many courts, determining whether there is historical disadvantage 
requires an assessment of the “full legal, social and political context” of the 
impugned legislation and the claimant.161 For example, in Daybutch, Justice 
Feldman directly cites the Court in Withler in order to reaffirm that historical 
disadvantage is linked to “social, political, and legal disadvantage in our 
society.”162 In that case, Justice Feldman considered whether the impugned 
law was discriminatory for Aboriginal individuals only after first considering 
markers of pre-existing disadvantage, including the impact of colonialism on 
Indigenous people, the assimilationist policies of respective governments, the 
trauma inflicted by residential schools, the over-representation of Aboriginal 
individuals in the convicted offender population, and substance abuse issues in 
the Aboriginal population.163 In Daybutch, the presence of “centuries” of systemic 
discrimination was the determinative factor in Justice Feldman’s finding that the 
impugned law violated section 15.164
Another interesting development following Quebec v A is that some courts 
have resurrected the Law framework as a guideline for factors outside of stereotype 
and prejudice that may be considered in the section 15 analysis. I observed 
earlier that Quebec v A and Taypotat both adopt some of the Law language and 
revisit concepts popularized in that case, therefore it is unsurprising to see courts 
drawing upon the Law decision to guide them towards other relevant factors.
For example, in Chambers YKTC, Justice Ruddy noted that the factors 
enumerated in Law are helpful tools to assess the larger social, political, and 
158. Descheneaux, supra note 120 at para 116.
159. Ibid at para 117.
160. Ibid at para 134.
161. See e.g. Chambers YKTC, supra note 119 at para 172; Daybutch, supra note 119 at paras 
84-86; Catholic Children, supra note 4 at para 53.
162. Daybutch, supra note 119 at para 86.
163. Ibid at 98-99.
164. Ibid at paras 98-101. See also Chambers YKTC, supra note 119 at para 165.
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legal context within which a section 15 claim is occurring.165 Promisingly, Justice 
Ruddy avoided applying Law in the rigid manner for which Law had originally 
drawn criticism; instead, she noted that the factors were non-exhaustive and could 
be mutually exclusive, that is, not all of them had to be applied formulaically.166 
For example, the fact that the impugned legislation failed to meet the actual needs 
and circumstances of the claimant group was sufficient to demonstrate that the 
law was discriminatory.167 Other cases have agreed that the use of the Law factors 
post-Quebec v A/Taypotat are merely “suggestions for consideration,” and that 
they are neither exhaustive nor must they be “expressly canvassed in every case.”168
In the subsequent Manitoba Provincial Court case of Bittern, Justice 
Carlson applied Justice Ruddy’s approach in Chambers, relying on Law as a 
source of non-exhaustive factors that may demonstrate discrimination. However, 
in Chambers, Justice Ruddy specifically acknowledged that the factors in Law 
need not be applied “formulaically,” as the relevant factors may “vary with the 
facts of a given case.”169 In contrast, in Bittern, Justice Carlson applied each 
factor mechanically, one-by-one, before coming to a conclusion on whether the 
impugned law was discriminatory or not.170
In Madeley, Justice Paciocco similarly looked at the Law factors to guide 
the inquiry into whether arbitrary disadvantage, stereotypes, or prejudice were 
perpetuated. For him, it was important to start by assessing the first factor—
pre-existing disadvantage—since “when it exists, [it] can inform decisions about 
relevant prejudices, stereotypes and arbitrary disadvantage.”171 On the facts, Justice 
Paciocco’s inquiry used the Law factors for guidance, by focusing on whether 
the law at issue exacerbated the historical economic disadvantage of the mentally 
disabled and the “perception of prejudice” faced by this group. But the decision 
also went beyond the strict application of the four enumerated Law factors to 
consider a host of other contextual factors, including the marginalization of the 
165. Chambers YKTC, supra note 119 at para 172.
166. Ibid at para 175.
167. Ibid at paras 171-75.
168. See e.g. Shenandoah, supra note 119 at para 44.
169. Chambers YKTC, supra note 119 at para 172.
170. Bittern, supra note 119 at paras 108-14.
171. Madeley, supra note 10 at para 149.
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mentally disabled, their “exclusion from full participation in society,” and their 
“experience of displacement.”172
Some courts have even begun to look at the factor of “human dignity,” 
popularized by Law (but subsequently demoted by Kapp) as an indicator of 
discrimination.173 Whether the use of human dignity was an appropriate basis 
to ground a section 15 breach was one of the issues on appeal in Adekayode. 
In that case, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal clarified that prejudice, stereotypes, 
and historical disadvantage are all non-essential elements of showing a breach of 
substantive equality. In so doing, it upheld the decision of the Human Rights Board 
of Inquiry, which had found that a challenged distinction was discriminatory on 
the basis that it implicated a claimant’s human dignity.174 The Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal concluded that while human dignity cannot be used as a “confusing 
hurdle to substantive equality,” it is permissible to use human dignity as “a 
broad purposive guide” to analyze discrimination.175 Although Adekayode was 
decided in the human rights context, the court drew on section 15 jurisprudence, 
including the observation from Kapp that the protection of equality “has as its 
lodestar the promotion of human dignity,”176 in making its holding. Therefore 
Adekayode carries implications for Charter claims as well.
One of the most comprehensive discussions of the factors that may inform 
the inquiry into discrimination under section 15 stems from Justice Chappel’s 
judgment in Catholic Children. Because the section 15 inquiry is flexible, Justice 
Chappel stated that it must take into account “all factors that are relevant to the 
particular case under consideration,” including “the purposes and objectives of 
the impugned scheme, the actual needs, interests and circumstances of the people 
impacted by it, and all relevant social, political, economic and historical factors 
concerning the claimant or group in question.”177 She noted that prejudice and 
stereotype may be two such indicia, but that they are only possible indicia, not 
necessary ones.178 She also added that evidence of the law’s effect on human 
172. Ibid at paras 25-26. Although, admittedly, the Law factors were non-exhaustive, 
no additional factors beyond the original four set out by that decision have since been 
widely recognized. Moreover,  an individual’s experiences of marginalization, exclusion, and 
displacement – which may be circumstances indicative of discrimination – do not fit neatly 
into any of Law’s four original categories. On the other hand, such individualized experiences 
may potentially fall under the general umbrella factor recognized in Law, human dignity.
173. Ibid at para 47.
174. Adekayode, supra note 120 at paras 77, 94-97.
175. Ibid at para 95.
176. Ibid at para 94, citing Kapp, supra note 6 at para 21.
177. Catholic Children, supra note 4 at para 53.
178. Ibid at para 54.
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dignity may serve as a relevant factor in determining whether the distinction has 
created or perpetuated disadvantage. Again, a claimant is not required to point to 
a law as creating an affront to his or her dignity, but a distinction’s impact on an 
individual’s dignity may support their inquiry where present.179
Justice Chappel compiled a list of additional contextual factors that may be 
relevant in assessing discrimination,180 many of which seem sourced directly from 
Law. These include:
1. The existence of historical disadvantage on the part of a claimant or 
group: Although not a precondition, historical disadvantage is an 
important factor given that one of the main purposes of section 15 
is to ensure fairness for those claimants who are disadvantaged on 
a larger scale. Such evidence will be accorded “significant weight,” 
because it is logical to conclude that a differential treatment will 
perpetuate the burdens that vulnerable groups face.
2. Arbitrary disadvantage: It is easier to demonstrate discrimination 
if a claimant can show that the impugned law failed to take into 
account his or her situation. The inquiry must ask whether the 
distinctions imposed by a law reflect the purpose of the law and are 
appropriate vis-à-vis the claimant group.
3. Ameliorative effects: Laws that create distinctions to alleviate 
inequalities affecting other disadvantaged groups should be assessed 
considering their “overall ameliorative effects and the multiplicity 
of interests that it attempts to balance.”
4. The nature and scope of the benefit which the claimant has been 
denied: The more significant the interest affected, the more likely 
that treating this interest in a differential manner will amount to 
discrimination.
5. A comparative analysis: Although a rigid comparative analysis is not 
required to determine whether the impact of impugned legislation 
is discriminatory, it may be helpful to compare the effect of the 
legislation on the claimant or distinguished group to other groups 
affected. This comparative exercise may assist with deepening one’s 
understanding of the claimant’s place in society as a whole.
Finally, some courts have focused on a law’s “disproportionate effect” 
on either the specific claimant or the general claimant group as a central factor 
179. Ibid at para 55.
180. Ibid at para 56.
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for determining section 15 breaches.181 For example, in Ejigu, Justice Davies of 
the British Columbia Supreme Court asked whether sections 16(2) and (3) of 
the Criminal Code (which require that an accused claiming to not be criminally 
responsible due to suffering from a mental disorder must do so on a balance of 
probabilities) had a disproportionate effect upon the claimant as a consequence 
of the claimants’ national origin. To answer the question, Justice Davies evaluated 
the specific circumstances of the claimant, taking into account the fact that she 
was a woman who had immigrated to Canada from Africa, who was socially 
isolated, and whose language and cultural difficulties affected her ability to meet 
the burden imposed by the impugned provisions. In doing so, Justice Davies 
discussed at length the obstacles Ms. Ejigu faced speaking to psychiatrists who 
did not speak her native language, the fact that Ms. Ejigu’s linguistic and cultural 
difficulties negatively impacted her ability to present her case, and the difficulty 
courts and counsel would have in comprehending and appreciating her cultural 
differences.182 After a detailed assessment of Ms. Ejigu’s personal context, Justice 
Davies ultimately concluded that the provisions did not violate her right to 
substantive equality because while Ms. Ejigu faced a disadvantage due to these 
cultural differences, the disadvantage did not arise because the law targeted her 
either directly or indirectly as a member of a disadvantaged group.183 Rather, the 
disadvantage arose because of the increased burden imposed by section 16 on all 
mentally incapacitated accused seeking to establish a criminal defense.184 Further 
mitigating against a finding of disadvantage were the specific accommodations 
made in the case: A dedicated interpreter was provided for Ms. Ejigu during all 
court processes, as well as her psychological assessments.185
Justice Davies also considered whether the law had a disproportionate 
effect on the mentally ill as a whole. Justice Davies concluded that there was 
discrimination, because, aside from the defence of non-insane automatism, there 
is no other instance in the Criminal Code in which the criminally accused must 
establish a defence on a balance of probabilities. In all other instances, all that an 
accused must do is raise an air of reality (a low burden), before the burden shifts 
to the Crown to prove the defence does not apply.186 Considering the different 
onus borne by the mentally ill was part of a broader analysis, which assessed 
181. See Adekayode, supra note 120 at paras 65-66; Catholic Children, supra note 4 at para 47; 
Ejigu, supra note 120 at para 182.
182. Ejigu, supra note 120 at paras 178-85.
183. Ibid at para 188.
184. Ibid at paras 188-90, 194-96.
185. Ibid at para 205.
186. Ibid at para 256.
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whether the disproportionate effect of the provision exacerbated the historical 
disadvantages faced by mentally ill persons, by widening the gap between mentally 
disabled accused persons and those accused who are not.187 In conducting his 
analysis in this manner, Justice Davies considered both the individual effects of a 
law on the claimant, as well as the overall effects of a law on the claimant group, 
in resolving whether discrimination had occurred.
These decisions demonstrate that courts have taken to heart the message 
of Quebec v A and Taypotat to conduct the section 15 inquiry with a broad 
emphasis on context and systemic disadvantage. Courts brought in stereotypes 
and prejudice into the inquiry when appropriate but resisted relying on these 
indicators when not. Courts have treated pre-existing disadvantage as a robust 
indicator of discrimination, but again have not made it a mandatory one. They 
have been willing to look at the specific context affecting the individual claimant, 
as well as the broader social, political, and historical context of the claimant’s 
associated group. Questions of power imbalances have been brought to the 
forefront of the inquiry. The actual adverse impacts of the law on the claimant 
and claimant group have been closely examined, particularly when they give rise 
to disproportionate effects. And while the Law factors and human dignity have 
seen a resurgence, they have been applied non-exhaustively and as purposive 
guides rather than hurdles for claimants to meet. The contextual inquiry from 
Quebec v A and Taypotat has proven to be more than an empty refrain; courts 
have operationalized it and put it to good use with their individually tailored, 
thorough, probing, but non-restrictive inquiries into discrimination.
I therefore have little to add on this front; the cases discussed in this Part of 
the article consist of contextually sensitive inquiries that draw from all possible 
relevant factors, very much in line with the original vision of Andrews and the 
promotion of substantive equality. The only recommendation that I would 
make relates not to what courts have done but rather to what they have failed to 
mention in light of Quebec v A and Taypotat.
In both Quebec v A and Taypotat, Justice Abella devotes much of her decision 
to a discussion of historical disadvantage as an important indicator of arbitrary 
or discriminatory disadvantage. In doing so, she excludes any discussion of other 
factors. What needs to be emphasized in future decisions is not that historical 
disadvantage is just another factor that can inform the section 15 inquiry, but 
that it is compulsory for demonstrating discrimination. As it stands, Justice Abella 
speaks about historical disadvantage in near-mandatory terms, making it appear 
as if the “court is coming closer to requiring the law’s ‘perpetuation’ of an historic 
187. Ibid at paras 257-58.
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disadvantage before discrimination can be found.”188 This outcome should 
not be encouraged, lest historical disadvantage become the new prejudice and 
stereotyping: that is, a mandatory factor that fails to capture the full range of 
ways in which a law can be discriminatory, and that thus serves as a barrier rather 
than a gateway to protecting substantive equality.
Although historical disadvantage will be highly relevant to many section 15 
claims, in some circumstances it may be difficult for claimants to proffer the 
proof necessary to demonstrate this factor or to link historical discrimination 
to the present-day discrimination they may be complaining of. Additionally, 
there may be novel types of discrimination that are historically unprecedented 
either because the grounds for discrimination are novel, such as discrimination 
because of genetic makeup, or because a traditionally privileged group faces 
discrimination in a particular context, such as men being discriminated against 
as child-care workers. These types of claims warrant review under section 15, 
but will not be accompanied with a history of disadvantage. Therefore, while 
historical disadvantage may be a useful indicator of discrimination in many 
instances, it should not serve as the be all end all of the discrimination analysis 
as the net it casts is not quite wide enough to capture discrimination in all cases.
IV. CONCLUSION: QUEBEC V A, TAYPOTAT, AND THE 
JOURNEY TOWARDS SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
Alongside the recommendations that I have made up to this point, it is important 
to remember the positive developments that have emerged for section 15 
claimants from the Quebec v A and Taypotat decisions. Despite the courts’ 
fluctuating approach to discrimination, a constant theme has arisen in that 
courts have recognized the importance of conducting a contextual and purposive 
analysis to accommodate for different understandings of equality and specific 
issues raised in a given case.
Some cases, like Kapp and Withler, failed in deploying this theme due to 
their improper focus on overly narrow indicators of restriction. By removing 
the requirement for claimants to show stereotyping and prejudice, Quebec v A 
and Taypotat reinvigorate Andrews’ promotion of a broad, contextual section 15 
analysis and ensure the inquiry will not be conducted according to a “fixed and 
limited formula.”189 More importantly, their move towards a less formalistic, less 
188. Hamilton & Koshan, “Arbitrary,” supra note 172 at 21.
189. Catholic Children, supra note 4 at para 48.
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onerous standard will better serve claimants in the pursuit of substantive equality. 
Marc Gold made the following comments soon after Andrews was released:
The equality provisions in the Charter are like the three-dimensional image in a 
hologaphic plate. Although one may break the plate into a thousand pieces, shining 
a laser beam through any one of the shards will reproduce the image in its entirety. 
So too is it with the concepts of “equality” [and] “discrimination” ... . Out of any one 
of these concepts can be generated all of the principles that we distribute amongst 
the various clauses of s[ection] 15 ... . At the risk of overstating the case, to criticize 
the Court for some of its shortcomings of analysis in Andrews is to ignore the very 
nature of equality itself.190
Gold recognized then that equality is a concept inherently fraught with 
difficulty. It means different things to different individuals in different groups at 
different times, making it impossible to distil “equality” into a single, working 
definition. In my view, the approaches developed in Quebec v A and Taypotat 
implicitly acknowledge that in order to deploy section 15 in a purposive 
manner—that is, a manner that is sensitive to systemic disadvantage and aims for 
substantive equality—we must avoid a universal approach divorced from context.
As the SCC has made its journey towards a complete test for section 15, it has 
admittedly taken a circuitous route that has at times bewildered those litigants 
who followed. But the destination, the end goal, has always been the same: 
substantive equality. The question has merely been which doctrinal methodology 
best serves this goal. And though subsequent refinements have repeatedly kicked 
up the sand in otherwise settled and clear waters, there has been a slow but 
steady growth towards that elusive, but most admirable goal. Do Quebec v A 
and Taypotat end the journey? No, but they do make important strides aimed at 
capturing more holistically what it means to face discrimination.
190. Gold, supra note 42 at 1079.
